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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study was designed to explore the viability of an alternative method of measuring
affordability (the residual income method) to that of the ubiquitous 30 per cent
benchmark method and to use this alternative method for enriching understanding
around a range of affordability and housing market issues. The work has been
exploratory but it does reveal both the potential and the limitations of the method. This
Final Report was preceded by a Positioning Paper (Stone et al. 2011) which reviews
the national and international literature on measuring housing affordability and
outlines the methodology and assumptions behind the residual income method.
Put simply, the residual income method calculates how much is left over for housing
rents or mortgage after relevant expenditure items for different household types have
been taken into account. If there is insufficient left for rents and mortgages after
meeting this budget standard, a household has an affordability problem. The basis for
formulating such a measure for Australia was enabled by the development of
indicative budget standards by the Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC) at the
University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998). They established a low cost
budget standard (LCBS) and a modest cost budget standard (MCBS); the former
might be seen as a minimum level of consumption in contemporary Australia, while
the latter allows for a comfortable but far from luxurious lifestyle. Both have been used
in this study, but with most emphasis on the LCBS, and have been indexed to relevant
years by a composite index of the CPI minus housing component and of disposable
Income.
This Final Report is not an exhaustive treatment of the residual income method but is
designed to illustrate its potential, relative to benchmark methods, for understanding a
number of housing affordability related issues. And, while the subject matter could
potentially be quite technical and detailed, the report aims to minimise the detail and
concentrate on understanding and exemplification. The report has a number of
objectives. These are to:
1. Use the residual income method to calculate the distribution of housing
affordability in Australia in aggregate and for individual household types by tenure,
income, state and other relevant variables in order to get some assessment of the
scale and distribution of residual income affordability. This includes comparison
with the ratio method, either the aggregate 30 per cent measure or the more
targeted 30/40 ratio, that is, 30 per cent for the lowest 40 per cent of income
earners.
2. Compare these aggregate Australian findings with those for the USA, as
representing a form of benchmark to assess how badly or well Australia performs
in terms of affordability.
3. Model the affordability capacity of case study households (single person, couple
with two children) across a broad income range to provide a better understanding
of how affordability constraints, as indicated by the residual income method, are
potentially shaping the operation of housing markets.
4. Illustrate using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets what the
residual income method suggests about the performance of these housing
markets in terms of affordability.
5. Illustrate using the Melbourne rental market what the residual income method
suggests about the performance of this housing market and associated
submarkets in terms of affordability.
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6. Test the appropriateness of the residual income method for social and affordable
housing rent-setting policy and eligibility practices.
These objectives have required their own sections in the report, with their own
distinctive findings summarised in Section 8. However, the major findings or
implications are:
1. Appropriateness of the model. For a broad measure of affordability across all
households, the residual income method provides results not too dissimilar to the
benchmark method, but in terms of compositional elements where the results are
affected by the type of household and their different expenditures it is likely to be
more accurate as to what is the household experience. For example, it is obvious
that large families will have more expenses than smaller ones and that this will
affect their capacity to purchase or rent.
2. For the households examined (representing about 75% of all Australian
households), the residual income method (for the lowest 40% of income earners)
shows a much higher incidence of affordability problems, 33.6 per cent using a
LCBS, compared to 23.9 per cent by the 30/40 method. One reason why the
30/40 disposable income rule is lower than the LCBS for those households in the
lowest 40 per cent of income earners is that under 30/40 principles no social
housing tenants have an affordability problem (it is defined away) where the LCBS
identifies that most do so. The second is that outright owners, again by definition
in the 30/40 rule, cannot have an affordability problem but the LCBS says that
small numbers can, although strictly speaking it is not a housing affordability
problem but a liveability problem, that is, their incomes are too low to cover the
necessities of life even without a mortgage.
3. In terms of various compositional effects, the data shows that renters have the
most severe affordability problem, with aged renters the worst off, 84.3 per cent of
singles and 62.2 per cent of couples being below the LCBS.
4. Families are also problematic, particularly if they have younger children. Among
households with children, 34.3 per cent were below the LCBS, but if the children
were under five it was 68 per cent. Why this is the case is probably a combination
of the additional costs of the second children being less (they can use the first
child’s belongings) and, more importantly, a parent may have to drop out of the
workforce for some time to undertake child-rearing functions. If they had taken on
a mortgage on the assumption of two incomes, this could explain what appears to
be a higher incidence of affordability problems among young families in ownership
than in rental.
5. Hitherto in Australia there has been little attempt to break down the income
composition of households below the 40 per cent decile. In this study we do this,
and not surprisingly find that the affordability problem is most intense in the bottom
two income deciles when using the LCBS, indeed, they account for 75 per cent of
all households with an affordability problem. But, suggesting the housing
affordability problem is as much an income support problem as a housing cost
one, 73 per cent of households below the LCBS (mostly in these two bottom
deciles) had government pensions or benefits as their main source of income.
6. If we use the MCBS we find some 30.7 per cent of households are below that
standard. These are very high proportions, with the implications here not being
just about housing but a broader one about the economy: a very large proportion
of Australian households after meeting housing costs have little capacity to save
or to purchase goods and services beyond what is needed for a modest lifestyle.
Mortgage default data indicates that such housing stress levels are not resulting in
people falling out of housing, as in the USA, but it is likely that other consumption
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is being sacrificed. Perhaps it is little wonder that the retail, hospitality and
domestic tourism sectors in Australia have been flattish for some time, given the
degree to which housing costs crowd out other expenditures. And, of course, as
the affordability problem deepens there will be even less capacity to consume
other items. The crowding-out effect of housing costs on other expenditures is an
obvious point but one that has not been made strongly enough in Australia: high
housing costs may have major impacts on economic growth.
7. A comparison of the scale and form of residual income affordability between
Victoria and Massachusetts (very comparable states in similar market liberal
societies) found that affordability was much worse in Massachusetts, but again
this has more to do with income support than housing costs (see Section 4). This
emphasises another point that is often neglected, that is, affordability solutions are
not always about housing. The form and structure of income support (as
discussed in Section 4) is fundamental to understanding issues around housing
affordability. This section also highlighted the limitations of raw measurement tools
such as those of Demographia (2010) in international comparisons of affordability.
This would have Melbourne relative to Boston as an affordability basket case but,
using the more nuanced residual income method, this is not so: taking into
account household composition and residual incomes in relation to house prices
and rents, Boston is much worse.
8. Section 5 outlined a residual income model building exercise where for any
household type and income the relevant deductions (taxation) or additions (family
allowance, benefits) could be made. This then creates a residual income that
enables, as illustrated in Figure 1 (a case study of a couple with two children), a
working out of how much is left over to afford ownership or rental. The modelling
shows that (a) there are very great differences in ability to purchase or rent
between household types, with families the most problematic, and (b) above a
certain income point there is much greater capacity to purchase or rent than the
much used 30 per cent rule would tell us. This, as Section 5 discusses, gives us a
better understanding of housing dynamics, including why people can still purchase
in the face of what seem insurmountable prices and rents and why the building
industry is building what it does and where (one and two-bedroom apartments in
the inner city, detached houses on the fringe).
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Figure 1: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget
standard and two measures of housing affordability, couple with two children, 2010

9. Section 5.3.3 applied the modelled household residual incomes to the Melbourne
and Adelaide residential property markets in 2010 to assess to what degree there
were affordability constraints across housing submarkets for different household
types contemplating first-time home purchase. For both markets, it found that
families with incomes less than $40 000 were out of the market, and between
$40 000 and $80 000 their only option was outer suburbs and, in Melbourne,
growth areas. Not until household income exceeded $100 000 was there much
ability for families to purchase in the inner city and middle ring. The short message
here is that having children and home purchase are potentially important tradeoffs for many first-time buyer households. On the other hand, singles and couples
on incomes above $60 000 had much wider housing choice and could effectively
consider inner urban purchase, particularly in Melbourne where, unlike families,
they could choose one and two-bedroom apartments.
10. Section 6.2 illustrated the use of the residual income method for developing price
points for what represents affordable housing for different household types. These
could be used in inclusionary zoning or planning negotiations with industry around
affordable housing provision. The price points when linked to data on the income
distribution of renters also suggest the usefulness of the method in getting some
assessment of how many such households can afford to become home
purchasers. The answer is: increasingly few.
11. As discussed in Sections 5.3.3 and 8, these household affordability differentials
appear to be shaping a new urban and social form, with families and detached
housing on the fringe and non-family households in inner city and middle ring
locations clustered in growing numbers of one and two-bedroom apartments. As
discussed, there may be long-term problems in such an urban form.
12. Section 7 looked at the implications of the residual income model for social
housing, including capacity to be an alternative basis for setting rents. The
conclusion was that it does not have this capacity. If rents were set at the budget
standard for public housing, they would have to be at levels that would greatly
compound financial viability problems for housing agencies. Into the bargain, a
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residual income rent remains a household rent, with all the administrative costs
and work disincentive implications of such a rent.
13. The residual income method does show that many public tenants are in hardship
after paying a so-called affordable rent, the 25 per cent household rent, which is
not surprising as there has never been any rationale for it as an affordable rent. If
rents were set to an affordable level, it would mean near zero rents for some
household types and incomes but increases for others. Thus, under the current
rent structure, those on very low incomes may be paying an excessive amount of
income on rents and not leaving enough for other expenditure, while those on
higher incomes in most cases have more than enough to live on after paying the
25 per cent household rent (see Tables 18, 19, 20 and 21). However, if rents were
restructured to reflect these inequities, the net effect would likely be a major
reduction in rental income for housing agencies in a context where they are
already financially problematic. In short, this exploration of the implications of the
residual income model only adds to the evidence that the current mix of a flat 25
per cent household rent and a market rent is highly difficult for tenants and
housing organisations. Funding and rent-setting reform is necessary, but the latter
requires dealing with the former first.
14. The residual income model was used to test income eligibility for the National
Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) and the discounted market rent for targeting.
How well does the scheme meet the affordability capacity for the various
household types? The answer (reflected in Table 22) was ‘very well’, with the
general conclusion being: ‘If only public housing, and perhaps by default
community housing, rent could be as well targeted to what households can
actually afford!’
The analysis did prompt consideration of whether similar levels of funding could be
used for a home ownership program, as discussed in Section 8.

Conclusion
While exploratory, the findings in this report suggest the usefulness of the residual
income method as a basis for more informed decision-making around affordability
issues and for more detailed analysis of the implications. As one of the model’s
limitations is the complexity in creating it, this Final Report is accompanied by a
template of the model to enable any agency or individual to undertake residual income
analysis based on whatever assumptions of gross income, interest rates, deposits,
taxation, pensions, benefits and allowances are relevant to their research purpose.
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1

INTRODUCTION

While researching this report, one of the authors had to visit a dentist. The dentist
started talking (why they do so when patients cannot answer back is a puzzle) and
commented on how he found the high house prices in Melbourne completely
inexplicable and was worried about his children’s housing futures. Now, if a dentist on
his high salary is expressing puzzlement over high house prices, it is understandable
why large proportions of ordinary Australians do likewise. The next day one of us was
attending the launch of the first evaluation report of a homelessness pilot program,
and the speeches had many in the audience reflecting on how has this all occurred.
Why, at the most affluent point in our history, do we have more homelessness, more
people in marginal housing forms (e.g. boarding houses, caravans) and longer waiting
lists for social housing than at any other time in our recent history? Obviously part of
the answer is about politics and policy and, to be blunt, a political unwillingness to
tackle these problems. But in part, and where this study comes in, it is also about the
fact that, despite considerable research, there are still gaps in our knowledge of the
scale and form of our housing problems and the relationship to housing markets and
policy.
Housing affordability and housing market dynamics (in the case of this project, the
latter a shorthand for the drivers of and the decision-making processes in housing
markets) have moved to the front of the housing policy agenda in recent years. While
the two topics are related, different processes have given them greater prominence.
The former (housing affordability), of course, has been around for decades (Priorities
Review Staff 1975; Committee of Inquiry into Housing Costs 1978; National Housing
Strategy 1991; Productivity Commission 2004) and takes on renewed vigour every
time there is an escalation in interest rates, house prices or rents, although the first
two get much more attention, particularly from the media, than the third (rents). And
the lack of policy reform varies inversely with the number of reports and studies: the
more there appear to be, the less that happens.
Economists have long given attention to housing markets but rarely has this analysis
had such prominence in research and policy environments. One reason is recognition
that markets can fail, for example the collapse of the Irish, Spanish and US housing
markets, with major implications for economies and society. But another is that, in
Australia, we still do not know enough about what drives house prices and rents,
about the decision-making of market actors (consumers, builders, investors) and how
they might respond to changing policy environments. In a context where the external
environment for housing users and producers is becoming more complex as a result
of demographic growth, sustainability needs, government fiscal constraints and rising
consumer expectations, this lack of understanding of market dynamics is troubling.
This report is a contribution by intent to the affordability literature and by default to the
housing market dynamics literature. In other words, in seeking to provide a better
measure and explanation of the housing affordability problem in Australia we provided
findings which give us a different and perhaps better understanding of how Australian
housing markets work.
This is the Final Report from a large study on using the residual income approach to
measure housing affordability. For those unfamiliar with the concept, this is an
alternative to the benchmark method of affordability measurement and calculates how
much is left over for rents or mortgages after relevant expenditure items for different
household types have been taken into account. If there is insufficient left for rents and
mortgages after meeting this budget standard, a household has an affordability
problem.
6

The study does not aim to replicate the substantial housing affordability research
already undertaken by AHURI in the National Research Venture 3 (NRV3) but to build
on that research (Yates & Milligan 2007). It is therefore much more limited in focus,
and complements the NRV by updating and expanding information on the scale and
form of affordability using a residual income approach and by taking affordability
research in some new directions (i.e. as a tool to understand housing market
dynamics). A substantial Positioning Paper (Stone et al. 2011) already written on the
topic did two things.
Using existing literature, Part A provided an overview of the various semantic,
substantive and definitional issues around the notion of affordability, leading to an
argument in support of the soundness of the residual income approach. This overview
is set in the historical contexts of discussions about affordability measures in the
Australia, the UK and the USA.
Part B was methodological; it showed for selected household types and income
ranges, both for home purchase and rental, how the residual income method can be
operationalised. The latter also provided details on the methodology and, although
there has been some fine-tuning for this Final Report (discussed where relevant in the
text), there is no need to repeat the methodological details here. However, a summary
of the method is provided in Section 3.
This Final Report is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the residual income
method but is designed to illustrate its potential, relative to benchmark methods, for
understanding a number of housing affordability related issues. And while the subject
matter could potentially be quite technical and detailed, the report aims to minimise
the detail and concentrate on understanding and exemplification for an informed lay
public.
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2

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Building on the Positioning Paper, this Final Report has a number of objectives. These
are to:
1. Use the residual income method to calculate the distribution of housing
affordability in Australia in aggregate and for individual household types by tenure,
income, state and other relevant variables in order to get some assessment of the
scale and distribution of residual income affordability. This includes comparison
with the 30/40 measure of affordability to evaluate the difference.
2. Compare these aggregate Australian findings with those for the USA, as
representing a form of benchmark to assess how badly or well Australia performs
in terms of affordability.
3. Model the affordability capacity of case study households (single person, couple
with two children) across a broad income range to provide a better understanding
of how affordability constraints, as indicated by the residual income method, are
potentially shaping the operation of housing markets.
4. Illustrate, using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets, what the
residual income method suggests about the performance of these housing
markets in terms of affordability.
5. Illustrate, using the Melbourne rental market, what the residual income method
suggests about the performance of this housing market and associated
submarkets in terms of affordability.
6. Test the appropriateness of the residual income method for social and affordable
housing rent-setting policy and eligibility practices.
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3

WHAT IS THE RESIDUAL INCOME METHOD?

Australia has almost become immune to stories about the scale of the housing
affordability problem. A considerable amount of research shows that mortgage stress
for lower income households has increased over the last decade and that the absolute
numbers and percentages involved are high. Using the 30/40 rule, Yates and Gabriel
(2006) found 49 per cent of purchasers were in housing stress, while the National
Centre for Social and Economic Modelling (NATSEM) suggests around 35 per cent on
the same criteria (Tanton et al. 2008). Among renters, the figures are even more
startling with Yates and Gabriel (2006) finding that 65 per cent of all renter households
were in housing stress and in fact accounted for 51 per cent of all low to moderate
income households with an affordability problem.
These studies used a benchmark method of measuring housing affordability to
produce these results. This method typically takes 30 per cent of gross and sometime
disposable income committed to mortgage or rental payment as the benchmark and
applies this either to all households or to the lower 40 per cent. However, it takes no
account of the different taxation and expenditure requirements of different household
types and thus may overstate or understate the actual amount a household type has
available to afford housing. As discussed in the Positioning Paper, it has also been
criticised because there is no clear rationale that underpins the chosen benchmark
and for its inability to indicate price points to guide industry or government as to what
represents affordable housing.
The major alternative method for measuring affordability is the residual income
method which, as the name implies, calculates for different households how much is
left over for housing after relevant expenditure as measured by some budget standard
is taken into account. Table 1 below compares the ratio and residual method at their
most simplistic. Both Household A and Household B have incomes of $40 000. If a
ratio of 30 per cent is used, Household A has $12 000 to spend on housing, but if a
residual method is used and the budget standard for that household type (Household
B) is $30 000 they only have $10 000 available. In the latter case, if there is
insufficient left for housing after meeting this standard, then the household has an
affordability problem. The challenge in creating such a measure is: what is an
appropriate budget standard?
Table 1: Simplified comparison of ratio and residual affordability measures
Household

Affordability measure

How much can be spent on
housing?

Household A: gross income
$40,000 per annum

Ratio method: 30% of income

$12,000 (30% of $40,000)

Household B: gross income
$40,000 per annum

Residual method: How much
is available if budget standard
is, say, $30,000?

$10,000 ($40,000 less
$30,000)

The basis for formulating such a measure for Australia was provided with the
development of indicative budget standards by the Budget Standards Unit of the
SPRC at the University of New South Wales (Saunders et al. 1998). Drawing
theoretically and methodologically upon the extensive history of such work in the UK
and USA, but pushing beyond it, they formulated normative budgets as the sum of
cost standards (as of February 1997) for nine separate categories of consumption.
Two budget standards were established: ‘modest but adequate’ and ‘low cost’. The
‘modest but adequate’ standard was similar to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) ‘intermediate’ budget, which had earlier been called ‘modest but adequate’. The
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‘low cost’ standard was similar to the BLS ‘lower’ budget and the UK Family Budget
Unit ‘low cost but acceptable’ budgets that have been used to operationalise residual
income affordability standards for the UK and USA (see Positioning Paper).
Throughout this report we refer to the two budget standards as the MCBS and the
LCBS.
One of the notable advances of the Australian indicative budgets over the work in the
UK and USA is that the MCBS was computed for 26 household types and the LCBS
for 20 household types, differing by size, composition and tenure. This level of detail
obviated the need for contentious equivalence scales1 that plagued the UK and US
standards and the Henderson poverty standard in Australia. The Australian budget
standards are, however, only for areas where costs for household expenditures are
normal. They do not factor in the different expenditures in remote and regional areas
where transport and other costs related to distance are much higher than in
metropolitan areas or nearby regional areas.
This data base provides the foundations for measuring the scale and form of a
residual income affordability problem in Australia by stripping out the housing
expenditures estimated in the budget standard, such as mortgages and rents, thus
making it possible to calculate the residual left for housing. This is not the first time
that this has been done In Australia. Seelig (1999) and Burke and Ralston (2003) did
some exploratory work using census data and Yates and Gabriel (2006) applied it to
the 2002–03 ABS Income and Housing survey. This study also uses the ABS Income
and Housing survey data but updates it to 2006–07, with the caution that both the
method used and the data attributes were slightly different to those of Yates and
Gabriel’s analysis and therefore direct comparison with that study cannot be made.
The major difference is that fewer households were included in the current analysis.
This study only looks at the main household types of singles, couples, couples with
one, two or three children, and sole parents with one or two children, partly on the
grounds that other household arrangements have more complicated financial and
housing cost relationships creating more difficulties of analysis, but also because a
template is to be created by which residual income data can be updated by any
agency interested in doing so, and the more household types, the more work is
involved in undertaking such a process. But even within these household types there
were exclusions. Households with children were excluded if they had a nondependent offspring as their income is typically not included in the acquisition of a
mortgage (and may or may not contribute to rental costs), and therefore to include
their income would understate the affordability problem. For the same reason,
households with more than one income unit or multi-income units were also excluded,
other than those which were an income of the reference person or their
spouse/partner. Also excluded were those households renting privately from a parent
or other relative.
Other household arrangements were excluded because the data would not be
meaningful or relevant, for example those who had disposable incomes of less than
zero or if their disposable income minus housing costs left zero income. Households
who had mortgages, but other descriptors indicated the borrowing was not for the
house being lived in but a second house (e.g. rental unit or holiday home), were also
1

When there is no expenditure data to use to calculate the different expenditure needs for different
household types, each household type in the population is assigned a value in proportion to its needs,
that is, an equivalence scale. For example, a childless couple might be deemed to have 0.8 needs of a
couple with one child. The factors commonly taken into account to assign these values are the size of the
household and the age of its members (whether they are adults or children). The problem is that there is
no internationally accepted set of equivalence scales.
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excluded. After these deletions, 72 per cent of all households were still included in the
analysis for both years.
Some may question why the data was not pushed back further, for example to the
1997–98 Income and Housing survey, to allow for some historical analysis. The
reason is that the survey record files in that year are set up as ‘income units’ within a
household rather than as an actual household as is the case for 2003–04 and 2007–
08. Furthermore, the 1997 survey did not have disposable income as a variable. Thus
the data for the 1990s is non-comparable to that for 2003–04 and 2007–08.
The other methodological challenge in updating the SPRC budget standards was
what index to use in order to bring them up to the relevant year. In the Positioning
Paper, the ABS consumer price index was used, but this Final Report uses a
composite index made up of 50 per cent of the CPI all groups minus housing and 50
per cent of the per capita household disposable income index, the latter being the
same index as used by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social
Research (MIAESR) (2011) for the construction of its poverty line. The former can be
seen as a measure of the cost of the basket of goods that makes up the expenditure
standard, and the latter as a measure of changing aspirations and as recognition that
there are new items of necessary expenditure now that were not recognised in 1998,
for example mobile phones and broadband web connection. A composite was seen to
be appropriate as the household disposable index used by the MIAESR would
exaggerate the rate of increase as it is solely an income measure and has no
relationship with expenditure, while the CPI would be too low as it is only about a fixed
bundle of expenditure and does not allow for changes in consumption and the
emergence of new expenditure items as incomes rise. Setting an appropriate index
will always be a vexed problem in the absence of updated budget standards (see
Appendix 2 for more details on indexing).
To exemplify the broad level of expenditures determined by indexing of the budget
standard, Table 2 shows the 2010 LCBS and MCBS excluding housing for owner
occupiers and renters for each of the household types. For example, a young single
person living to a LCBS could get by on spending $275 per week while, say, a couple
with three children would require $747. If they were to live to the MCBS, expenditures
would be a lot more.
Table 2: LCBS and MCBS for selected household types, 2010
LCBS 2010
composite index

Household type
Single
Couple
Couple with
children

Sole parent

MCBS 2010
composite index

Under 65

$275

$392

65 and over

$272

$377

Under 65

$416

$603

65 and over

$400

$548

1

$555

$805

2

$655

$975

3

$747

$1,233

1

$348

$565

2

$467

$771

Source: Original budget standard data; Saunders et al. (1998); indexed by composite of ABS CPI and per
capita household disposable income.
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These budget standards when applied to measures of income and housing costs
provide the potential for determining the scale of affordability problems and the
capacity for households to participate in the market, whether for rental or purchase.
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4

THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The large AHURI affordability study (NRV3) concluded that there were major
weaknesses and limitations in current approaches to assisting households to access
and maintain affordable housing (Yates & Milligan 2007, p.38). While there have been
some policy changes since then, they have not been substantive enough or sustained
enough to make any real impact on the affordability problem, and in fact the situation
has been worsened by continuing escalation of rents and house prices above the rate
of growth of household incomes. Yates and Milligan’s conclusion thus still stands.
Table 3 below lists the major forms of housing and housing-related policy that affect
housing affordability in Australia and summarises their policy intent, the degree to
which they have any performance measurement attached, and their strengths and
weaknesses in terms of dealing with affordability issues. The distinction between
housing and housing-related policy is an important one as Australia has few housing
explicit policies (i.e. designed for designated housing outcomes). Much policy is
designed for other outcomes and the effects on the housing market and submarkets in
most cases are accidental or collateral. Nevertheless they are still as important as, if
not more important than, explicit housing policy.
In terms of this research, which is concerned with affordability as a complex
relationship between incomes, expenditures and housing costs, the crucial policies
are those related to incomes and housing costs. Often housing affordability studies
tend to focus just on housing costs but income support policies are also crucial; house
prices and rents may be low by international standards but if incomes are even lower
then there is an affordability problem.
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Table 3: Housing and housing-related policy instruments, Australia, 2011
Supply/demand
side directed

Explicit
housing
outcomes

Income
support
outcome

Performance
measures

National Affordable
Housing Agreement
(NAHA)

Supply side

Yes

No

National Rental
Affordability Scheme
(NRAS)

Supply side
program to deliver
50,000 units at no
more than 80% of
market rents

Yes

First Home Owner
Grant (FHOG)

Demand

Common-wealth
income support
program

Commonwealth
Rent Assistance
(CRA)

Affordability outcome

Weaknesses

Strengths

Substantial

Yes, but not to the
degree necessary to
eliminate hardship.

Funding
inadequate for
scale of the
problem so that
supply increments
now marginal.

Ensures an
element of
affordability for
recipient
households.

No

Substantial

Yes, but not to the
degree that
eliminates hardship.

Not enough of it.
Ten year lifespan.

Increases supply
of lower end
housing.

Yes

No

No

Unclear but may
actually accentuate
problem by
increasing prices.

Untargeted.
Not sufficiently
focused on new
supply.

Boosts home
purchase market
in times of
flatness.

Neither. Provides
pension and
benefits to low
income
households.

No

Yes

No

Income support, no
affordability
objectives.

To a large extent
payments premised
on outright
ownership.

Provides
minimum income
safety net.

Demand side
income support
program to assist
eligible households
in the private rental
sector.

Yes

Yes

No

Alleviates rental
pressures but does
not produce
affordability.

Untargeted to high
cost locations.
No housing
outcomes in terms
of supply, quality,
sustainability.
Not available to
public housing

Alleviates rental
pressures for low
income
households.
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tenants.
Negative gearing

Planning

A tax rule that
allows investors,
not just in
residential
property, to write
off cost of
borrowing used to
acquire an asset
as well as other
holding costs.

No

No

No

None

Not targeted to new
supply.
No requirement for
any affordability
outcome.
Increases demand
pressures and
prices.
Maximum
assistance to those
who need it least

Maintains
neutrality of
residential
property vis-à-vis
other investment
categories.
When used for
new construction
increases supply
of housing.

Yes

No

Some

Very limited

Limited targeting
for affordable
housing.
Restrictive
provisions can
undermine
affordability.

Has potential to
target to specific
locations and
quantities.
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Part of the problem for Australian housing affordability is that income and support
payments (i.e. pensions and benefits) are simply too low for households in receipt of
them to afford the level of private housing market rents and prices, and the same
could be said of the household rents charged in social housing. Income support
payments are welfare payments made by the Commonwealth Government whose
principles were broadly set decades ago (beginning in 1909 for the first age pension)
to meet (very) basic consumption needs, with the view being that recipients are
dependent on those payments as their primary source of income (Mendelsohn 1979).
What represented basic consumption needs at the time and the various payment
structures that were evolved to address them were different to the present, and the
system has away been handicapped by two features: first, the assumption that
payments were made out of general tax revenue (i.e. it was not a contributory system
as exists in virtually all other developed societies) (Hill 2006, p.47); and second, that
recipients of benefits (originally just aged persons) would be outright home owners
(Kemeny 1981). The former assumption was premised on a belief that entitlement to
social security was rights based and related to need, rather than something to be
‘bought’ by paying a financial contribution (Kewley 1969). Given the funding of
payments out of tax, this has meant that any attempt to substantially boost income
support payments founders on the problem that this would require an increase in tax
levels to fund it. And with Australia being a conservative market liberal nation broadly
resistant to taxation, despite being one of the least taxed countries in the OECD
(OECD 2010, Table A), the constraints on any government wishing to increase
income support levels are substantial. Historically this has meant that there has been
no universal attempt to boost payments overall, but rather reform has come
incrementally by extending eligibility to new groups (but not increasing levels of
funding) or by creating a highly targeted add-on payment, such as the supplementary
payment for age pensioners which morphed into CRA (Herscovitch & Stanton 2008).
The second assumption, home ownership, has always meant a low level of payment
compared to equivalent societies. The standard measure of such payments is the net
replacement rate, that is, the degree to which a pension or unemployment benefit
replaces employed earnings. Using this measure, OECD data reveals that Australia is
one of the bottom countries (out of 28) in terms of the level of such payments (Ortiz
2009; OECD 2011). While a general problem for all recipient households, the low level
of payments is a major problem for renters that is only partly addressed by CRA. And
while pensions and benefits are premised on outright ownership, we have to
remember that many of these income support payments are based many decades in
the past and have been indexed from such times, and by 2011 there is no guarantee
even for outright owners that they will automatically cover all expenditures required to
keep to a minimum and certainly a budget standard.
Turning now to housing rather than income, it is notable that the two housing-specific
policies that offer definite housing affordability outcomes are the National Affordable
Housing Agreement (NAHA) (formerly the Commonwealth-State Housing Agreement
(CSHA)) and the NRAS. However, in terms of delivering affordability outcomes, they
are both compromised. In the case of NAHA/CSHA, the capacity to address
affordability problems for low income earners has been weakened by a funding
environment which is financially unsustainable both for housing agencies (Hall & Berry
2007) and for many clients, the latter because of the adoption of a household rent
(typically around 25% of income) that has more to do with revenue generation than
actually providing a rent that leaves sufficient to live on (i.e. meeting a budget
standard) (Burke & Ralston 2003; McNelis 2006). Compounding these problems is a
decade and a half of targeting to those with the highest needs (worsening the cost
structures of social housing) and creating an affordability gap in eligibility for low wage
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households (the working poor) or those without complex needs as very few of these
two groups can now access, or be eligible for, social housing.
NRAS was a welcome supply-side initiative of the 2007–10 Labor government
designed to provide assistance and funding to increase the supply of affordable rental
dwellings for lower to mid-income earners. It does so by providing an incentive of up
to $9140 per annum ($6855 from federal and $2285 from state governments,
increasing annually by the CPI) for investors willing to provide housing that meets
designated standards and with rents charged out at no more than 80 per cent of
market rents. There are to be 50 000 NRAS properties funded. While this will make a
useful addition to the stock of housing that is more affordable than full market housing,
the rents charged do not necessarily mean affordability as defined by the budget
standard method. However, this does depend on the household type and where a
household falls in relation to income limits which are much higher than for social
housing. The real advantage of supply-based schemes, such as NRAS, is that, by
increasing the stock of lower end rental housing, they potentially mitigate rental
pressures, although 50 000 is not a substantial amount, given the deficiency of low
cost private rental stock (Wulff et al. 2011).
CRA, often seen as a housing payment, is in fact an income support payment, starting
out as indicated above as a supplementary payment for age pensioners who were
private renters. Eligibility has widened over the years but the program is weakened by
the levels of payment not being linked to any affordability target. The objective is to
reduce the effect of high rents, and it does put many households into a more
affordable situation (Melhuish et al. 2004) although again not for the working poor,
given that eligibility only extends to those in receipt of income support. Rates of
increase are not linked to increases in rents, thus, as rents rise faster than incomes,
the ability to provide any semblance of affordability is further weakened and there is
no difference in payment rates between different housing markets despite major
variations in rents. Like other countries that have a rental allowance system imbedded
in an income support system with no explicit housing objectives, there is no evidence
that allowances, for example CRA, have stimulated an increase in the supply of rental
housing that is affordable for households in receipt of them (Hulse 2002). Instead,
there is a decreasing supply of affordable housing (Wulff et al. 2001, 2011). It also has
no quality requirements, and this arguably has been a contributing factor to the recent
growth of illegal boarding houses in capital cities where landlords extract excessive
rents, which include capturing CRA for a minimal standard of dwelling (normally one
run-down room), from individuals unable to access other affordable rental
accommodation.
Of the other policies, FHOG, taxation and planning appear to be as much part of the
affordability problem as a solution in that they all have the potential to increase
dwelling prices or rents rather than stabilise them. Thus, with minor exceptions in New
South Wales and South Australia, current approaches to planning and managing
residential development and redevelopment are not directed to assisting affordable
housing provision (Gurran et al. 2008) while tax policies appear to be encouraging
demand by investors but with much of that investment going into existing stock rather
than new supply, with the gap in new investment most visible at the lower end of the
market (Wulff et al. 2011). FHOG also appears to be an important driver of demand
rather than of supply outcomes (Wood et al. 2003; Newman 2002).
In short, the current policy environment in relation to lower income renters, aspirant
purchasers and struggling first-time buyers is unlikely to provide many with a solution
to their affordability problem. In principle, one might think therefore that the scale of
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the problem could create a ‘policy window’ where reform of the current policy
environment might occur.
However, one suspects that the collapse of home purchase and associated house
price falls in other home ownership societies, such as Ireland, Spain, UK and the
USA, following the global financial crisis has removed any desire to touch policy that
might destabilise or help dwelling prices and rents fall in the interests of greater
affordability. For Treasury and Finance departments concerned primarily with
economic stability and productivity, affordability is not a problem unless it links through
to these two objectives. Thus, while we may document in this study that some 14 per
cent of Australian households are under major financial and wellbeing pressures, this
is seen by central agencies as a personal trouble for such households, not a problem
that affects the stability or productivity of the economy. If this affordability problem was
to threaten mortgage default and cause an economic downturn the position would
change but, as data provided by Berry et al. (2010) and Hulse et al. (2010)
demonstrates, at the time this data was collected (2007–08) this was not the case in
the Australian context. Moreover, given that housing wealth is a driver of consumption
(Yates & Whelan 2009), central agencies would be reluctant to risk a contraction in
consumer spending by policies which would undermine that wealth by reducing
dwelling prices. Similarly at the state level, stamp duty is a major source of revenue
and thus any slowdown in property turnover or contraction in prices will affect the
bottom line of state finances. In this policy environment it is easy to see why dramatic
reform by way of improving affordability is not, and in some respects cannot be, a
major government objective. Reform must be incremental and managed in such a way
as not to threaten market stability. The question in this study is what research findings
might it yield which could contribute to incremental reform.
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5

RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.1

Measuring the scale of the affordability problem

The first research task for the residual income method using the 2007–08 ABS
Income and Housing Survey was to compare the aggregate findings with the 30 per
cent benchmark method (both gross and disposable). Table 4 below reveals that there
are differences, but not consistent differences. For the key measure in Australia, that
is, for the lowest 40 per cent of income earners, and using the LCBS the latter is
higher (33.6%) than the 30/40 disposable income method for all households (23.9%)
but lower for private renters (47.7% vs 61.7%). If the MCBS is used, this method is
higher for all households other than private renters where it is almost the same as the
30/40 (32.8% vs 27.0%). If a gross 30/40 rule is used, the overall (all households and
tenures) percentage is slightly higher again than the LCBS (15.8 vs 14.1%). Given
these differences, we might conclude that for an overall measure of affordability (i.e.
all households and tenures), the 30 per cent rule is fine as it is not that different to the
LCBS budget standard. However, for compositional analysis by tenure and income
type, the residual method is likely to be more accurate.
One reason why the 30/40 disposable income rule is lower than the LCBS for those
households in the lowest 40 per cent of income earners (33.6% vs 23.9.0%) is that
under 30/40 principles no social housing tenants have an affordability problem (it is
defined away) where the LCBS identifies that most do so. The second is that outright
owners, again by definition in the 30/40 rule, cannot have an affordability problem but
the LCBS says small numbers have a financial problem, although it is not a housing
affordability problem but a liveability problem, that is, their incomes are too low to
cover the necessities of life even without a mortgage.
Table 4: Households with an affordability problem: LCBS, MCBS and 30 per cent
benchmark method
Below
LCBS

Below
MCBS

Paying more than
30% of disposable
income on housing

Paying more than
30% of gross
income on housing

All households

14.1%

30.7%

21.0%

15.8%

Lowest 40% (of
equivalised disposable
income)

33.6%

69.6%

23.9%

23.3%

All households, private
renters

17.0%

32.8%

31.9%

27.0%

All households, private
renters lowest 40%

47.7%

85.2%

61.7%

60.2%

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files.

Turning to the tenure-specific data, Table 4 (all households) and Table 5 (lowest 40%)
show not surprisingly, and consistent with other findings, that renters have the most
severe affordability problem although in absolute numbers they are just slightly beaten
by owners. On the LCBS measure for the lowest 40 per cent of household incomes,
55 per cent of renters in 2007–08 had an affordability problem compared to 22 per
cent of owners. For the MCBS, it was 88 per cent and 60 per cent respectively. These
are very high proportions, with the implication here not just about housing but a
broader one about the economy: a very large proportion of Australian households
after meeting housing costs have little capacity to save or purchase goods and
services beyond what is needed for a modest lifestyle. As noted earlier, mortgage
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default data (Berry et al. 2009) indicates that such housing stress levels are not
resulting in people falling out of housing as in the USA, but it is likely that other
consumption is being sacrificed.2 This raises the possibility that housing outlays,
whether mortgages or rents, are another factor in explaining subdued consumption
expenditure in other sectors. Do housing costs crowd out other expenditures? And, of
course, as the affordability problem deepens, there will be even less capacity to
consume other items.
While there is some evidence that housing wealth can increase consumption (Yates &
Whelan 2009), the counter-argument could be put that some of the effect is negated
by the costs associated with generating that wealth, that is, the foregone consumption
required of large mortgages and rents. There is not the evidence here to rigorously
support the argument but it is worthy of more attention, given the scale of the
affordability problem and that all consumption requires trade-offs between different
goods and services. Perhaps suggestive of the need for further work here is Figure 2
below. This figure shows the long-term trend in retail spending and highlights that the
current flatness is not a phenomenon of the last few years, as much industry and
media commentary would suggest, but is part of a sustained flatness relative to the
high rates of spending of the 1980s. This is despite the latter not having the same
availability of easy finance as more recent years. However, what the era of more
subdued retail spending coincides with is the major decline in housing affordability
since the 1990s. It is a relationship needing more research.
Figure 2: Retail turnover: percentage change on previous financial year, 1984–2011
14%

12%

10%

8.9%

8%

Average
6%

4%
2.6%
2%

0%
1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

2004

2008

Source. ABS Retail Turnover by Industry Group, Tables 8501.0, Retail Trade, Australia

2

It should be noted that the data collection was in 2007–08. Given that rents and particularly house
prices have increased since then, with many buyers purchasing in 2009 when interest rates were 3 per
cent, there are now likely to be greater affordability problems and potential for default. No doubt some
buyers who took on mortgages at 3 per cent had not planned on them (or budgeted for) being 7.5 per
cent in 2011.
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It is low income public renters who have the most severe affordability problem (69%
LCBS 2007–08), which contradicts the false assumption that the 25 per cent
household rent formula shelters such tenants from an affordability problem (see
Tables 5 and 6). The 30/40 rule by definition means that no public housing tenants
have an affordability problem but it is tautological, of course, to call such a benchmark
the affordable rent (as noted earlier, such ratios have no rationale) then set the rent at
this level and subsequently claim all households who pay such a rent are in a position
of housing affordability.
What this public housing affordability data reveals is the severe stress on both tenants
and housing organisations of operating in a funding context (the NAHA) that can
provide neither affordability to tenants nor financial sustainability to organisations.
Rents have to be pushed to these unaffordable levels to create some semblance of
financial sustainability for housing organisations but, in doing so, enormous pressures
are placed on the tenants. However, this affordability outcome does not mean that the
impact bears equally on all tenants, as a flat rent-setting formula does not recognise
the affordability capacity of different household types. This point is taken up in more
detail in Section 8.
Table 5: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, all households
Tenure
Owner without a mortgage
Owner with other mortgage

Below LCBS
Households
174,210

Below MCBS

%
8.3%

Households

%

641,141

30.7%

Total
households
2,087,036

28,522

6.7%

66,704

15.7%

424,164

Owner with a mortgage

212,692

12.2%

404,019

23.2%

1,740,077

OWNER

415,424

9.8%

1,111,864

26.2%

4,251,277

Private renter

216,799

17.0%

417,524

32.8%

1,273,462

Public renter

186,337

65.4%

251,982

88.5%

284,735

RENTER

403,135

25.9%

669,506

43.0%

1,558,197

Total

818,559

14.1%

1,781,370

30.7%

5,809,474

Table 6: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, lowest 40 per cent of equivalised income
Tenure
Owner without a mortgage
Owner with other mortgage

Below LCBS
Households

%

174,210

14.7%

Below MCBS
Households

%

Total
households

641,141

54.2%

1,183,967

26,671

25.7%

60,047

57.9%

103,631

Owner with a mortgage

178,280

56.2%

282,278

88.9%

317,477

OWNER

379,161

23.6%

983,466

61.3%

1,605,075

Private renter

214,356

47.7%

382,713

85.2%

448,987

Public renter

186,337

69.1%

251,982

93.4%

269,727

RENTER

400,693

55.8%

634,695

88.3%

718,714

Total

779,853

33.6%

1,618,161

69.6%

2,323,789

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

Another cut on the affordability problem is that between first and subsequent home
purchasers who purchased in the last three years. One could hypothesise that firsttime purchasers would have the greater affordability problems as with no equity they
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would have to borrow more, as well as in all likelihood being younger and having not
yet reached their income earning peak. Table 7 below shows the residual income
affordability outcomes for first and second and subsequent buyers by both the MCBS
and LCBS, for all households and for the lowest 40 per cent of income earners.
Table 7: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, lowest 40 per cent of equivalised income by first and subsequent home
purchaser, 2007–08
All households
LCBS
Households

%

MCBS
Households

Lowest 40%
%

LCBS
Households

%

MCBS
House%
holds

First-time
buyer

28,524

11.3%

54,392

21.5%

20,594

62.6%

32,211

97.9%

Changeover buyer

44,045

11.6%

86,443

22.9%

37,977

60.8%

59,177

94.8%

Total

72,569

11.5%

140,834

22.3%

58,571

61.5%

91,388

95.9%

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

Perhaps surprisingly, there is remarkable similarity: there is not a lot of evidence that
first-time purchasers, whether all households or lower income households, have any
more residual income problems than second and subsequent purchasers. What this
suggests is that many households (the bulk in the case of lower income households)
extend their purchasing capacity close to or beyond their residual income when
buying. As pointed out elsewhere, the implication of this is not one of dropping out of
ownership (Australian households have a remarkable ability to stay in) but for the
purchase of other goods and services. However, the real attraction of the budget
standard measure lies less in the aggregated data than in its ability to provide more
accurate affordability measures for different household types. As Table 8 (all
households) and Table 9 (lowest 40%) show, singles under 65 and sole parents with
two children have the highest rates of an affordability problem. For those below the 40
per cent quintile, 42 per cent of singles have an LCBS affordability problem, rising to
62 per cent for those under 65. For sole parents, the figure is 39 per cent, but higher
(42%) for those with more than one child. If we just look at private rental the problem
is worse.
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Table 8: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, by household type, all households
Household type

Below LCBS

Below MCBS

Total

Count

Row%

Count

Single (under 65)

229,442

21.1%

322,245

29.6%

1,087,093

Single (65 and over)

160,979

24.1%

420,449

62.9%

668,343

SINGLE

390,421

22.2%

742,694

42.3%

1,755,436

Sole parent 1 child

48,987

20.9%

106,244

45.3%

234,506

Sole parent 2 children

41,450

27.9%

83,930

56.4%

148,827

SOLE PARENT

90,437

23.6%

190,174

49.6%

383,333

Couple 1 child

49,821

9.2%

107,540

20.0%

538,639

Couple 2 children

89,498

11.2%

205,690

25.8%

797,247

Couple 3 children

44,252

14.2%

127,369

40.8%

311,887

183,570

11.1%

440,599

26.7%

1,647,773

Couple (under 65)

76,471

5.7%

179,622

13.4%

1,345,151

Couple (65 and over)

45,656

6.7%

206,506

30.5%

677,781

COUPLE ONLY

122,128

6.0%

386,128

19.1%

2,022,931

Total

786,555

13.5%

1,759,595

30.3%

5,809,474

COUPLE WITH
CHILDREN

Row%

Count

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

Table 9: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, by household type, lowest 40 per cent based on equivalised income
Household type

Below LCBS
Count

Row%

Below MCBS
Count

Row%

Total
Count

Single (under 65)

214,927

62.4%

276,667

80.3%

344,463

Single (65 and over)

160,979

29.6%

418,625

76.9%

544,505

SINGLE

375,906

42.3%

695,292

78.2%

888,968

Sole parent 1 child

47,487

37.6%

95,339

75.5%

126,251

Sole parent 2 children

40,354

41.9%

77,484

80.5%

96,247

SOLE PARENT

87,841

39.5%

172,823

77.7%

222,498

Couple 1 child

47,441

42.2%

85,951

76.4%

112,481

Couple 2 children

78,104

34.8%

170,390

76.0%

224,341

Couple 3 children

43,208

34.2%

106,256

84.2%

126,255

168,752

36.4%

362,597

78.3%

463,077

Couple (under 65)

71,545

28.2%

160,698

63.4%

253,324

Couple (65 and over)

45,656

9.2%

205,744

41.5%

495,922

COUPLE ONLY

117,201

15.6%

366,442

48.9%

749,246

Total

749,700

32.3%

1,597,155

68.7%

2,323,789

COUPLE WITH
CHILDREN

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

In recognition of the private rental sector being the problematic one in terms of
affordability, Table 10 below provides greater detail on this sector and looks at rental
households in the lowest 40 per cent of income quintiles for each household type.
Using the LCBS it reveals high proportions of affordability problems across all
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household types, but with older households the stand-out group. Among aged singles
in private rental, 84.3 per cent have an LCBS affordability problem, and for couples it
is 62.2 per cent. In absolute numbers these are not huge, and for couples represent
less than 10,000 households. This group could be the focus of some form of targeted
assistance, for example rent assistance plus (see Section 7). Strangely, in private
rental the scale of the affordability problem decreases with additional children,
suggesting that the problem related to more children as revealed in Tables 8 and 9 is
more linked to home purchase.
Table 10: Number and percentage of lowest 40 per cent households in private rental
with residual income affordability problem, by household type
Household type

Below LCBS
Households
%

Below MCBS
Households
%

Total
households

Single (under 65)

67,817

60.9%

89,055

79.9%

111,406

Single (65 and over)

40,705

84.3%

45,719

94.7%

48,269

SINGLE

108,522

68.0%

134,774

84.4%

159,675

Sole parent 1 child

21,137

38.1%

45,783

82.6%

55,458

Sole parent 2 children

17,523

38.5%

39,772

87.4%

45,513

SOLE PARENT

38,660

38.3%

85,555

84.7%

100,971

Couple 1 child

20,062

48.3%

35,473

85.5%

41,507

Couple 2 children

18,475

27.8%

56,411

84.8%

66,527

Couple 3 children

9,163

29.6%

27,759

89.7%

30,950

COUPLE WITH
CHILDREN

47,699

34.3%

119,643

86.1%

138,984

Couple (under 65)

9,813

29.0%

28,440

84.1%

33,822

Couple (65 and over)

9,662

62.2%

14,302

92.1%

15,534

19,475

39.5%

42,741

86.6%

49,357

214,356

47.7%

382,713

85.2%

448,987

COUPLE ONLY
Total

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files (NB: incomes are based on
equivalised income)

The comments about the poorer affordability position of sole parents with two children
raise an interesting issue for if we drill down even further into the data and look at
households with children, we find that having a child under five years of age is a major
predictor of an affordability problem (Figure 3). Whether for sole parents or couples, if
the children were under five, the housing affordability problems increase sharply.
Thus, for sole parents and using the LCBS, 44 per cent with no children under five
had an affordability problem, but this increased to 68 per cent for those with a child
under five. The equivalent figures for a couple with children were 22 per cent and 33
per cent. This is probably due to a combination of the additional costs of the second
children being less (they can use the first child’s belongings) and, more importantly, a
parent may have to drop out of the workforce for some time to undertake child-rearing
functions. If they had taken on a mortgage on the assumption of two incomes, this
could explain what appears as a higher incidence of affordability problems among
young families in ownership than in rental.
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Figure 3: Percentage of households with children with residual income affordability
problem

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

Not surprisingly, as Figure 4 below shows, the affordability problem is most intense in
the bottom two income deciles when using the LCBS, but is spread more broadly if we
use the MCBS. Most previous studies on affordability In Australia have aggregated all
households below the 40 per cent rule, but this data draws attention to the need to
focus on the bottom two income deciles as they account for 75 per cent of the most
severe affordability cases. This suggests that the housing affordability problem is as
much an income support problem as a housing cost one as 73 per cent of households
below the LCBS (mostly in these two bottom deciles) had as their predominant source
of income government pensions or benefits. The bulk of these were in the private
rental sector which highlights the point that historically pensions and benefits were
premised on the assumption of outright ownership. Because of this assumption,
private renters dependent on pensions and benefits are always going to be in trouble.
This of course is one of the reasons why lower income singles (many dependent on
such income support) figure so prominently among the households with the most
severe affordability problems.
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Figure 4: Housing affordability, LCBS and MCBS, by income deciles, 2007–08

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

Figure 5 below summarises the state perspectives in terms of LCBS and MCBS
affordability in 2007–08. Affordability (i.e. the LCBS) was worst in New South Wales
and South Australia and best in Western Australia. For the MCBS, South Australia,
Tasmania and New South Wales were the worst. The high affordability proportions in
South Australia and to a lesser extent Tasmania, given their lower house prices and
rentals, reaffirms that much of the affordability problem at the low end is about
incomes as much as dwelling costs.
Figure 5: Percentage of households with residual income affordability problem, by
state, 2007–08

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files
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Whether in aggregate or broken down into its components, Australia has a serious
affordability problem. However, long and continuing exposure to such problems
appears to have made Australia somewhat immune to figures of these proportions.
Perhaps it is the case that while the affordability problem remains a personal trouble
for the households experiencing it rather than a wider problem for society, there will
be little policy action. Given that as researchers we are yet to fully demonstrate, most
notably to central agencies of government, how the affordability issue is a broader
social and economic problem, there is likely to be continuing lack of policy initiative
around the issue.
The key findings for this section are shown in diagrammatic summary in Figure 6
below. This shows the LCBS outcome applied to the lowest 40 per cent of
households. Figure 7 shows the outcome for all households (i.e. all incomes), but still
using the LCBS.
Figure 6: LCBS for households in lowest 40 per cent of incomes

Households
33.6%

Couple 39.5%

Private
Renters 47.7%

Public Renters
69.1%

Single 68.0%

Family with
children
36.0%

Purchasers
48.7%

Couple 44.2%

Outright
Owners 14.7%

Family with
children
44.5%

Single 72.9%

Couple 8.9%

Family with
children
22.0%

Single 20.1%

Figure 7: LCBS for all households

Households
14.1%

Couple 6.2%

Private
Renters
17.0%

Public
Renters
65.4%

Single 23.4%

Family with
children
17.8%

Purchasers
11.1%

Couple 6.9%

Single 15.8%

Outright
Owners 8.3%

Family with
children
12.0%

Couple 5.0%

Single 13.7%

Family with
children 7.3%

Source: ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files

5.2

The Australian and US comparison

Much of the formative work on the residual income model internationally has been
done by Michael Stone in the USA (Stone 1993, 2006). It was therefore thought
opportune to use his knowledge of the method and of US data to provide some
comparison with that of Australia.
In various typologies of countries, the USA and Australia tend to be aggregated
together as market liberal societies with an emphasis upon smaller government,
individualism and minimum welfare safety nets (Esping-Andersen 1990). How then do
we compare with another country with broadly similar social and economic attributes
although still with many differences, for example the larger population and huge
regional income differences of the USA?

27

The approach taken here is to control for some of these differences, not by comparing
the USA with Australia, but by comparing Massachusetts with Victoria. Massachusetts
has a population of 6.4 million compared to Victoria’s 5.5 million and each state is
dominated by a major metropolis, Boston (4.4 million) and Melbourne (4.1 million).
Both are characterised by affluent mixed economies experiencing strong growth
pressures, although Massachusetts less so since the global financial crisis.
As mentioned in Section 4, incomes as much as dwelling prices and rents drive the
affordability equation, so some brief commentary is required on both. One of the major
differences between the USA and Australia as market liberal societies is Australia’s
tradition of protecting wage levels as a means of achieving a minimum living standard
(Castles 1985). This century-old tradition (the first minimum wage was in 1907) stands
in contrast to many other countries where welfare spending is the path to ensure a
minimum standard and where there have been no or limited wage standards. The
USA is one of those countries where income support through the wage system has
been limited. In Australia the minimum wage in 2010 was just on A$15 per hour,
compared to A$8 in Massachusetts, which is one of the most generous US states in
terms of wage support (US Department of Labor 2010, Historical Table). Thus, for
those in the lowest paid employment, a Victorian worker will have considerably more
income than their Massachusetts equivalent.
If out of the workforce, the comparisons are much more complicated as they depend
on whether we are talking about age pensions, disability pensions or unemployment
benefits, and, in the case of the age pension, on the degree to which this is
supplemented by any private superannuation. The situation with the US age pension
is even more complicated as, unlike Australia’s flat rate, it varies depending upon
previous workforce income and age at retirement. However, for a single person on a
low income in the years prior to retirement (e.g. A$40 000), the US weekly pension in
2010 would have been of the order of A$270 compared to A$330 for an Australian
Centrelink pension, a slightly meaner level of support.
Unemployment benefits are also more complicated in the USA, with no national
unemployment program as it is left up to the individual states. Moreover, again it is not
a flat rate but related to previous income levels. Massachusetts again is one of the
more generous states in that claimants receive a weekly benefit of approximately 50
per cent of their average weekly wage, up to the maximum set by law which in 2010
was roughly A$600 a week with additional amounts, for example A$25 for each child.
However, the payment is only for a maximum of 30 weeks, unlike the time-unlimited
Australian payments (Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development 2010;
Centrelink 2010). For somebody previously on a full-time minimum wage of around
A$320 a week, however, the payment will only be A$160 a week. These compare with
an Australian single person Newstart allowance of $230 in 2010 (Centrelink 2010). In
short, for those made unemployed from low income employment, the Massachusetts
model is harsher than in Australia, particularly when we take into account that it is
time limited.
The other side of the affordability equation is rents and dwelling prices. Can US
incomes buy more because of cheaper rents and dwelling prices or vice versa? Table
11 below shows the broad attributes of the two states/cities in terms of rental and
house price values. On the surface there is a certain similarity. In 2006, the year
before the US housing market collapse, median rents for all property and sale prices
were almost the same in Boston as in Melbourne. Since then there have been
divergent paths, with Melbourne’s house prices and rents increasing and Boston’s
falling for prices and increasing for rents. However, medians always disguise
distributions, and one of the distinctive features of the US housing market is its much
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greater spread (in turn reflecting wider income inequalities) and, while data relating to
this is not available for Boston compared to Melbourne, it is available at a state level.
Where in Massachusetts 22 per cent of all dwellings sold for less than $200 000
(2009), in Victoria it was only 8 per cent, although the relative proportions (22% vs
18%) were closer in 2006 prior to the global financial crisis. One big difference which
the aggregate data does not show is prices for newly constructed dwellings. It would
be difficult anywhere in Victoria to find newly constructed property for less than
$200 000, but in Massachusetts in 2009 24 per cent of all dwellings constructed sold
for less than this amount (Bluestone et al. 2010, p.36).
Table 11: House prices and rents, Massachusetts and Victoria, 2006 and 2010
All property median rental

Median dwelling price

Percentage of all dwellings
for sale below $200,000

Year
Boston

Melbourne

Boston

Melbourne

Massachusetts

Victoria

2006

$246

$240

$370,400

$330,000

22%

18%

2010

$390

$350

$275,000

$460,000

24% (2009)

8%

Sources: Massachusetts: Center for Urban and Regional Policy (various years) The Greater Boston
Housing Report Card; Victoria: Office of Housing Rental Report and Valuer General’s Property Sales
statistics unit record analysis (all prices in Australian dollars at an exchange rate of 1:1)

With this context, what can we observe from the comparisons? Table 12 below, using
the same residual income approach to that of Australia,3 shows the number and
percentage of Massachusetts households (for the same set of households) with an
affordability problem as compared with Victoria. Both owners and private renters are
much worse off in Massachusetts. For Massachusetts renters, some 40.2 per cent
have an affordability problem using the LCBS and 56 per cent if using the MCBS. The
equivalent figures for Victoria are 24.1 per cent and 42.9 per cent. Given rent levels
which are not too dissimilar to Victoria’s, the difference is more likely due to the lower
incomes that many Massachusetts renters are on, which is both a function of the
labour market and benefits system but also of the higher proportion of sole parent
households, 20 per cent in Massachusetts compared to 15 per cent in Victoria (Center
for Urban and Regional Policy 2010, ABS 2007). This is not to say that the rents are
affordable. Even if incomes at the low end were increased somewhat, the rents in
both states/cities would be still too high for many lower income earners, illustrating
that the private market without interventions cannot (and never has been able to)
provide decent and affordable housing for all citizens.
Among home owners the differences are much less, with Victorians having a slightly
lower rate of affordability problems if using the LCBS (9.2% vs 13.9%). If the MCBS is
used, the situation is reversed, with 23.9 per cent of Massachusetts owners having an
affordability problem compared to 26.7 per cent in Victoria. The LCBS difference
appears to be a contradiction in that Victorian house prices are higher than those of
Massachusetts. However, the data conflates owners and purchasers (the data cannot
be separated out for Massachusetts) and it is likely that Victoria has a higher rate of
outright ownership, particularly for lower income earners, given that many entrants
into the market in the USA in the second half of the 1990s and 2000s were first-time
buyers (Belsky & Duda 2002; Gramlich 2007). By contrast, in Australia this group
3

The actual budget standards will of course differ because of different judgments as to what represents
essential expenditure. The US budget standard used to create the Massachusetts residual income is that
of the Economic Policy Institute (2005) indexed to 2007–08 by the US CPI. In Australia, the SPRC
budget standard is a composite of the Disposable Household Income Index and the CPI all items less
housing.
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contracted over the same period (Hulse et al. 2010; Flood & Baker 2009). Indicative of
this point is that for Massachusetts in 2006, 47 per cent of all purchasers were firsttime buyers (Bluestone et al. 2008, p.51, Table 4.5), while in Victoria they only
accounted for 19 per cent (ABS 2010b, Table 10b). And, as the global financial crisis
brought to light, many of those attracted into purchase in the decade to 2005 had
incomes too low or mortgages too high to sustain ownership (Gramlich 2007). Many
have been foreclosed, but many others are still hanging in there representing a
continued foreclosure threat in the US and Massachusetts markets.
One can hypothesise that the much higher dwelling prices in Australia created an
affordability barrier for many households, particularly families (see Section 5.3.2), and
even if Australian banks had ventured into the sub-prime loan territory there still may
have not been the take-up. In the US market, even a high cost one by US standards,
many properties seem so cheap (under $200 000 (in 2010 prices) is not unusual) that
ownership seemed the logical direction to take for those desiring doing so. By
contrast, in Victoria, the entry price to first ownership was much higher because of
higher dwelling prices and interest rates, and for many households it was just a bridge
too far. This meant the households that did take up borrowing in the 2000s were
higher income households (Debelle 2008, p.6). This analysis suggests that,
perversely, Australia’s affordability problem provided a cushion against the financial
crisis by keeping households that may have been foreclosed out of the market.
As a general point, the data highlights that the real problem sector in both societies is
the rental sector, but as both are dominated by the ideology of home ownership they
seem unable or unwilling to tackle the problems.
Table 12: Number and percentage of households with residual income affordability
problem, by household type, Massachusetts and Victoria, 2007–08
Renter
Household type

LCBS
Mass.

Vic.

Owner
MCBS

Mass.

LCBS

MCBS

Vic.

Mass.

Vic.

Mass.

Vic.

Single (under 65)

39.8%

31.3%

52.3%

38.0%

18.3%

11.9%

26.6%

21.7%

Single (65 and over)

47.9%

65.0%

64.6%

83.7%

29.0%

11.6%

40.6%

53.3%

SINGLE

42.3%

37.5%

56.1%

46.5%

22.6%

11.7%

32.3%

37.2%

Sole parent 1 child

42.4%

28.4%

57.1%

52.3%

13.0%

13.8%

23.4%

37.9%

Sole parent 2
children

53.4%

16.7%

69.8%

62.6%

14.7%

12.8%

29.0%

26.5%

SOLE PARENT

46.6%

22.9%

62.0%

57.2%

13.6%

13.4%

25.5%

34.2%

Couple 1 child

36.3%

15.4%

47.0%

46.9%

9.9%

9.0%

21.0%

17.9%

Couple 2 children

39.8%

24.4%

52.4%

66.8%

10.9%

10.6%

20.8%

26.3%

Couple 3 children

48.7%

17.6%

58.5%

74.4%

13.7%

19.3%

32.7%

43.9%

COUPLE WITH
CHILDREN

40.5%

18.7%

51.5%

56.5%

12.0%

12.1%

24.2%

27.6%

Couple (under 65)

17.9%

6.1%

33.0%

11.7%

4.0%

4.2%

6.4%

12.8%

Couple (65 and
over)

38.4%

40.8%

52.4%

72.9%

12.0%

5.2%

20.8%

26.2%

COUPLE ONLY

24.6%

9.0%

39.4%

16.9%

9.1%

4.6%

15.6%

18.2%

Total

40.2%

24.1%

54.3%

42.9%

13.9%

9.2%

23.9%

26.7%

Sources: Massachusetts: American Housing Survey 2007 (US Bureau of the Census 2008); Victoria:
ABS Income and Housing Survey 2007–08 unit record files
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Looking at the comparisons in terms of household composition, there are some
important differences. Give that renters are the problem tenure, the analysis
concentrated on them. In Massachusetts, it is sole parents who have the highest
degree of rental affordability hardship, but in the USA they do so to a not much
greater degree than couples with children, illustrating that the additional expenditures
required of children greatly impact on the ability to achieve affordability. And, as with
Australia, the problem worsens with each additional child. By contrast, in Australia it is
singles who have the greatest affordability problem, although predominantly those
over 65. There are probably two explanations for the much greater housing hardship
for Massachusetts family renters than Victorians. The first is that larger properties
(three and four-bedrooms) in Massachusetts are much more expensive than
equivalent properties in Australia, and second, support for children in Australia
through family allowance payments (A and B) is much more generous than the US
equivalents. For example, where the family allowance payment (Tax Benefit A) can go
up to A$100 per week per child depending on age, for Massachusetts the equivalent
is only A$25 per child. There is indirect family support in the USA delivered via tax
breaks and credits but these are strongly linked to employment, which means that
without an employed income, or just a minimum income, little family support is
forthcoming (OECD 2011). On the other hand, the greater affordability problems of
aged persons in Australia (notably those who are 100 per cent pension dependent)
are likely to reflect the flat pension structure, compared to one in the USA that varies
in relation to work history and age (more akin to Australian superannuation).
What this embryonic comparative analysis indicates is that housing affordability issues
are not just a function of housing programs but of the nature and degree of payment
of income support. And what it indicates in terms of Australia is that the area for
income support reform is aged singles, as both by comparison with the USA and by
comparison with other household types in Australia, this is the stand-out household in
terms of residual income affordability. A more minor point is that the data illustrates
the importance of more complex and nuanced analysis in comparative work. The
much publicised Demographia comparisons of affordability in Australia vis-à-vis other
English language countries would have Australia as the affordability basket case, but
the preceding analysis suggests a different story. While affordability may not be good
in Australia, as represented here by Melbourne, it is much worse in Boston and one
suspects in other large metropolitan areas of the USA. The difference highlights the
problem of using very raw one-dimensional measures of affordability, that is ratio
methods that take no account of the income source and distribution of a society, the
make-up of that society in terms of household types and the tenure composition;
Demographia is a home purchase affordability measure and takes no account of
rental affordability even though in its host country, the USA, many of the largest cities
(e.g. Los Angeles, New York, Washington and Boston) have more renters than home
owners.
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6

RESIDUAL INCOME MODELLING:
AFFORDABILITY AND HOUSING MARKET
DYNAMICS

To date, this study has complemented previous affordability research by updating or
expanding the detail on Australia or by making comparisons with the USA as a form of
benchmark. In this section the study changes direction and moves us into new
territory in the application of the residual income method, modelling the affordability
capacity of different household types in different housing markets. We want to know,
for example, what a couple with two children on a $60 000 income can afford by way
of rental or home purchase after deducting the relevant budget standard, or how does
increasing the income from $40 000 to $60 000 for, say, a single person improve their
rental or purchasing capacity. This can be achieved by working the residual income
method into a model that can:
 Provide for a broad range of incomes and household types a measure of capacity

to purchase or rent.
 Indicate what could be price points for affordable housing development for a wide

range of incomes and household types.
 Indicate affordability capacity in different housing submarkets.

This Final Report uses that methodology to exemplify each of these objectives, but
only for a few household types and two housing markets. However, it is replicable
more generally, and a by-product will be the provision of a template to model
outcomes for other household types and markets. In the course of modelling these
examples we offer some insights into explaining what the benchmark method
suggests is inexplicable, that is, the sustained increase in house prices despite
evidence that these prices are not affordable. It also offers a way to understand some
of the decision-making by residential developers in Melbourne and, given that
Melbourne is not particularly unique in Australia, in other Australian cities. Before
doing so, a brief review of the methodology and methodological hurdles is offered.
There are three major practical issues that have to be dealt with in translating the
residual income logic into an operational affordability standard. These are, first, how to
specify the monetary level of a minimum standard of adequacy for non-shelter items
other than taxes; second, how to scale this standard for various types of households;
and third, how to deal with personal taxes and other government benefits that
households on different income levels may receive.
As previously mentioned, the availability of the two SPRC budget standards has been
essential for this project, making it possible to devise and apply operational residual
income affordability scales based on both the very conservative standard of living
defined by the low cost budget and the modest but adequate standard defined by the
modest cost budget for a wide range of household types. For any nominated
household type, this essentially involves deducting the appropriate budget standard
from the household income, leaving a residual that is available to cover housing costs.
However, getting a measure of the relevant income is easier said than done as there
is the matter of taxes and income sources; that is, on top of any labour market
income, or if there is no such income, there are a whole range of pensions and
benefits such as family allowances that have to be factored in. In the residual income
method, it is a disposable income that faces the tension between housing and nonhousing necessities. This means that, to the extent that datasets and policy analysis
are based upon gross household incomes, prototypical taxes and income-based
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government benefits need to be computed as a function of income for every
household type in order to determine the relevant disposable incomes and thus to fully
operationalise a residual income standard.
Thus, what the model does is calculate for any income level the amount of tax paid
and any entitlements by way of benefits. The relevant tax (if any) is deducted from the
income amount while benefits (if any) are added. This creates the disposable income
from which either the LCBS or MCBS is deducted to produce the residual income
available for home purchase or rent. Appendix 1 outlines in detail the features of the
model and how taxes and benefits are incorporated into it. The Positioning Paper
provides even further detail, in particular, how it is worked through for two household
types, a single person and a couple with two children, which are used as case studies
in this report. This modelling is complex and certain assumptions have to be made
(again summarised in the Positioning Paper) but, for example, even for a couple with
two children the residual income will be different depending on how an income is
earned between the two adults; a household on $100 000 but with one adult head as
the sole income earner will confront a different tax and allowance regime than one
with both adult heads working. We adopt the latter. What details as to household
types, benefits and taxes are plugged into the model can be modified as the policy
environment changes, for example restructuring of benefits or new tax rates, and the
AHURI template in principle allows for such changes.
The home purchase and rental markets require separate models because the housing
cost and income measures and assumptions that sit behind these tenures, and which
are required to build the model, are different. For example, a renter’s income may be
boosted by CRA, compared to a purchaser who gets no equivalent subsidy, while
there are ongoing costs for owners (rates, repairs etc.) that renters do not have. So, in
looking at the applications of the model, let’s start with home purchase and the first of
the model’s applications.

6.1

The home purchase model

6.1.1 Maximum affordable mortgage repayments
One of the paradoxes of recent housing affordability data is that posed by the
question: If the home purchase affordability problem is so bad, how can low-moderate
income households still afford to buy? The annual international affordability report by
Demographia which compares median dwelling prices to household incomes for 1100
or so cities inevitably has Australia as the least affordable country among those
surveyed, and in 2010 it accounted for five of the top ten least affordable cities, with
Hong Kong pipping Sydney and Melbourne for the number one position. Such data,
along with the everyday observations of ordinary Australians, such as the dentist
quoted at the beginning of this report, causes people to reflect on how is this all
possible.
A large part of the answer is in the weakness of benchmark methods of affordability
as used by Demographia. Using the residual income method, we were able to
calculate the maximum weekly mortgage costs affordable for household incomes
above $30 000 per annum using, as with all purchase examples in this study, the 7
per cent interest rate holding for Australia in early 2011. Here we illustrate the findings
for a single income household (Figure 8), a childless couple (Figure 9) and a couple
with two children (Figure 10). Each shows the weekly mortgage affordable for all
incomes between $30 000 and $150 000 and for two versions of the budget standard
(MCBS and LCBS) and for two 30 per cent benchmarks (gross and disposable
income). Note that the vertical line is the 40th income percentile for this household
type and for purchaser households only. It should be emphasised again that the
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incomes on the horizontal axis are the gross incomes, while that which is modelled to
give the residual income removes relevant taxes and adds in any allowances such as
child payments.
Figure 8: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget
standard and two measures of housing affordability, single person household, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

The findings are significant. First, as illustrated in Figure 8 above, a single person
willing to live on the MCBS can afford to pay much more per week on housing than if
the 30 per cent of income was used as benchmark for capacity to afford. Thus, a
single person whose income was at the 40th percentile cut-off ($52 000) could afford
a mortgage repayment, if he or she were willing to live to the MCBS, of around $360 a
week and $410 if the LCBS is used. This compares to $200 if the 30 per cent
disposable income benchmark is used. The $410 repayment capacity would enable
such a household to borrow around $260 000 compared to $125 000. The former in
most Australian cities could gain you the ability to purchase even if it is only a single
bedroom unit. The latter would not. This suggests that for certain household types,
properties are affordable when the benchmark method has been telling us they are
not. A simple plugging in of data to any financial institution’s mortgage calculator will
reveal that they recognise this and have clearly departed from any semblance of a
benchmark method, although since the global financial crisis they have tightened their
lending criteria. The Commonwealth Bank calculator as of May 2010 would, for
example, lend to a household with a $50 000 income and no other debt a mortgage
with annual repayments of $19 764, which represents 39.5 per cent of income. The
basis for calculation is unclear, but one suspects some form of a residual income
model. However, such calculators appear not to be household type specific, and there
is potential to use the residual methods to evolve more accurate mortgage
affordability calculators.
The greater capacity to pay than suggested by the benchmark method becomes even
stronger as incomes increase. Many people have speculated on how moderate
(although not necessarily low) income homebuyers have been able to afford the high
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prices of recent years, particularly if they are first-time purchasers who do not have
more than a minimum deposit. The residual income method offers an explanation. On
an income of $65 000 p.a., a single person would only be able to borrow $255 000 if
they are not to exceed 30 per cent of their income. Using the MCBS, however, they
could afford to borrow up to $368 000 which enables much more active participation in
the housing market. This person might be living modestly to achieve the latter loan
size but, provided there were no other issues that affected their expenditures (e.g.
maintenance payments to children of a previous marriage), they could afford the
repayments if this is how they chose to set their priorities. Of course, the further one
moves up the income scale, the more it could be argued that the MCBS is too modest
for such groups and they would spend more on other items. That is very likely the
case, but what the budget standard does show is the maximum potential for dwelling
purchase if a household was willing to make the expenditure sacrifices. If there was
no departure from the MCBS or only a smallish departure, it would be possible for
single person households on a good but not excessive income, for example $80 000,
to afford to borrow around $600 000, creating the potential to be a very active player
in the housing market. These figures in some cases do imply very high debt to income
ratios, in some cases more than 50 per cent, but it is not the ratio per se that is the
risk element, it is the capacity to pay.
Figure 9 below models the outcome for a childless couple. Here there is an additional
household member for expenditure to relate to so that, for any given income, the
housing cost affordable per week is lower irrespective of whether it is LCBS or MCBS,
although for purchasers we tend to prefer the MCBS as the standard given that
purchasers tend to be on higher incomes than renters and are likely to use some of
that additional income on non-basic expenditures. The figure also shows the 40th
percentile for all income earners for this household type with the fact that it is so high
in itself being a measure of the barrier to purchase, that is, a household type of this
composition requires an income greater then average to be a purchaser. A more
affordable market would have the 40th purchaser percentile at a much lower income
level.
Figure 9: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget
standard and two measures of housing affordability, childless couple, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index
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Now let us look at another family type: a couple with two children. The important point
to remember here is that the benchmark method ignores the number of family
members, whereas the budget standards build in the additional expenditures
generated by a larger family. Figure 10 below shows very different results to that of a
single person household. While the low cost residual income is still above both
benchmark measures for all incomes, the modest residual income (the most relevant
for purchasers) is below both of them until around the $85 000 to $90 000 income
point. In short, families require a relatively high income to participate in the home
purchase market and may be competing with singles or childless couples who have
much higher residual incomes and therefore affordability capacity. Moreover, they
have fewer dwellings to choose from as they will need at least a three-bedroom
dwelling, while smaller family types can choose smaller dwellings but can also
compete for the larger ones if they so want. What this all says is that the additional
living expenses of households with children constrain their ability to borrow and
therefore to afford housing even in lower price areas. This analysis is consistent with
the findings of Hulse et al. (2010, Ch.5) who, in their research on changes in lowmoderate income home purchasing patterns, noted a sharp decline in the number of
purchasers who are households with children and a very big increase in the proportion
who are single person, single income households, with these changes being much
greater than explainable by demographic change alone. When this information is
applied to actual housing markets (see Section 5.3.3), the analysis has even more
salience.
Figure 10: Maximum affordable mortgage repayments using two types of budget
standard and two measures of housing affordability, couple with two children, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

Figure 9 also indicated that if the MCBS is used as the measure for purchasers, then
below an $85 000 income a family is essentially out of the housing market as this
suggests capacity to afford a loan of around $400 a week that would enable the
purchase of a house for about $250 000, perhaps a possibility in regional areas with
weak labour markets or for a smallish run-down property in an outer urban
metropolitan market.
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The method suggests there is much greater capacity for households to afford housing
at the prices prevailing in Australia than benchmark methods indicate, and therefore
simplistic measures such as those of Demographia, which ignore household
composition and the costs of other goods and services, may distort or disguise the
real situation. For the growing number of smaller households in Australia, the
affordability situation may not be as bad as surface impressions suggest, with many
having substantial ability to afford what objectively might seem very high prices. On
the other hand, for the larger moderate income families there is a problem even worse
than suggested by budget standard methods. This latter point is made even more
visible by subsequent analysis.

6.2

Home purchase affordability price points

The next application of this model which follows logically from the above is the
identification of affordability price points. The model enables identification of the price
point that may be deemed affordable, given interest rates and deposit assumptions,
for all relevant household types and income ranges. A price point is that price
whereby a property is deemed affordable. It is a concept which has meaning to the
building and development industry in a way that an abstract notion such as a
‘benchmark measure of income to price’ does not, although the latter can be
converted into a price point.
Figure 11 below shows the affordable loan price point for a single person and family
(couple and two children), assuming a 7 per cent interest rate and a 25-year loan
period, and highlights the different price points of the residual income method
compared to the MCBS which is the method used for subsequent home purchase
analysis. For purchasers, it is assumed that the MCBS is more appropriate than the
LCBS, particularly as incomes rise.
For the single income household, the affordable mortgage using the MCBS is
$335 000. If a 10 per cent deposit was assumed, this would create a dwelling price
point of $368 500, or $400 200 if a 20 per cent deposit was assumed. This is much
higher than indicated by either of the ratio/benchmark methods. By comparison, the
affordable price points are much lower than for the couple with two children and,
importantly, even up to the $75 000 income point the figure shows that the ratio
method overstates their capacity to purchase. Even families on what might seem an
adequate household income could be struggling if pushed beyond relevant price
points.
For single person households it is interesting to note how the price points for the two
incomes, $65 000 and $75 000 (yielding dwelling prices of $368 500 and $465 500
respectively), are close to the advertised prices for many new one and two-bedroom
apartments in our capital cities. It is as if the industry has used similar thinking to
guide its production and pricing decisions.
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Figure 11: Affordable loan price points at nominated income levels, different family
types, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

While not central to the theme of this report with its emphasis more on first-time home
purchase opportunity, Figure 12 below provides the basis for looking at the impact on
the market of second and subsequent home buyers who have greater levels of equity
to bring to the purchase process. Using the example of a single person household, it
shows how current market prices, which some find hard to comprehend, are easily
reached. Thus, a single person on $90 000, such as many professionals, and with a
40 per cent deposit ($240 000 in this case) could afford an $840 000 dwelling. If on a
$100 000 income, that affordability goes up to $1 million. This could be someone who
at the age of 28 purchased, with a loan of $120 000, a unit in, say, 1996 for $135 000
(then the Melbourne unit median) and 15 years later uses the equity in that property
(now worth the Melbourne unit median of $423 000) to trade up. With that equity and
a willingness to live to the MCBS they can trade up to a quite expensive dwelling. This
in part is due to the sizeable equity enabled by dwelling price inflation and indicates
how the market up to a point feeds on its past history of growth. In the process it is
increasingly driving first-time buyers out of the market and potentially creating a recipe
for a market slowdown. This is illustrated by making the link between the concept of
price points and what renters as potential first-time buyers can afford.
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Figure 12: Affordable housing price points in different deposit assumptions, single
person, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

Figure 13 below suggests an exploratory but more nuanced way of understanding the
effects of affordability on housing demand than hitherto has been the case, even in
the National Housing Supply Council (2010, p.194) analysis of affordability of renters.
It shows the income distribution range of renters in the age cohorts 18–50 (potential
purchasers) for our two case study households plus childless couples, the largest
population group in the private rental sector. Renters represent the bulk of potential
first-time buyers. This concept of potential first-time buyers excludes those who are
living at home with parents and have the capacity to go directly into ownership, and
recent arrivals from overseas who also have the ability to go directly into ownership
(e.g. business migrants).
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Figure 13: Capacity for home purchase: Income distribution of three private renter
households and affordability price points, 2010

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

Assuming renter households could put together a 10 per cent deposit (in itself a
hurdle for lower income ones) and finance a 25-year loan at 7 per cent interest, the
figure suggests how many could in principle afford transition to ownership. This is
achieved by reading up the dotted lines for four relevant residual income price points
of $40 000, $60 000, $90 000 and $120 000. This shows the dwelling price affordable
at that income point for each household type based on the MCBS and therefore the
potential size of the market at that same point for each household type. Visually the
difference is clear: as house prices increase, the household income point necessary
to achieve ownership is pushed further and further to the right such that there are
fewer and fewer renters able to purchase.
Thus, at the $60 000 income point, a single person household could buy something
up to $329 000, with around 40 per cent of singles (all those above the $60 000
income point) able to afford such a price. By contrast, a couple with two children at the
same $60 000 income price point could only afford a $68 000 dwelling, of which there
would be none in Australia. Even so, around 35 per cent of renter couples with
children could not even afford this amount. It is not until a household income of
$90 000 is reached that prices remotely in the range of the Melbourne median are
affordable for a couple and two children. At $90 000 and a related price point of
$323 000, around 70 per cent of couples and children are out of the market; at the
same point a $585 000 property is affordable for singles, but less than a quarter would
still be in the market. Couples, the largest group in the rental market, could afford up
to $585 000 and at this price some 40 per cent would still be in the market. A
$120 000 household income would buy a $530 000 property for a family and an
$800 000 plus property for both singles and couples, but at this point the market has
declined substantially. For singles and couples with two children, it is now in the order
of less than 10 per cent, while for couples about 20 per cent of that market is left.
What the data suggests and again in a very exploratory way (it would need to be
fleshed out for all household types) is that, given the current level of dwelling prices
and interest rates, we would appear to be close to the point where first-time buyer
demand cannot be sustained, particularly for new family accommodation on the urban
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fringe. Prices for new dwellings have reached a point where many households, most
notably families, are out of the market. Using Melbourne as the example where new
dwellings (a house and land package) on the urban fringe are commonly in the range
of $370 000 to $500 000, probably less than 20 per cent of couples with children who
are renting could be in the market in these price ranges. Above $500 000 the market
for first-time buyers’ families is very small, but still reasonably large for couples and
singles. In this environment, a lack of demand for new construction will continue to be
subdued for the foreseeable future so long as prices and interest rates remain around
the levels of 2010–11. Prices must ultimately reach their affordability limits, and this
analysis suggests we are getting very close to them. The growth in new demand must
come from existing purchasers or investors.
The situation is somewhat better for established dwellings, but not a great deal, as
Section 6.3 discusses.

6.3

Reshaping housing opportunity: share of houses sold in
2010 with affordable purchase prices

The question was raised earlier: If the home purchase affordability problem is so bad,
how can low-moderate income households still afford to buy? As demonstrated
above, the residual income method suggests that many household types (notably
smaller households) have greater capacity to afford purchase than the benchmark
methods of affordability suggest. But the other reason why many low-moderate
income households can afford to buy is that many properties sell for less than the
metropolitan median, with many submarkets having local median prices some 30 per
cent below this. These locations are clearly more affordable.
To some extent this principle is recognised in the NAHA ratio (30%) indicator of house
price affordability which measures the proportion of homes sold that were affordable
to moderate income households, that is, those on less than the 40 per cent decile
where this is equivalised (adjusted) for the relevant family type. For example, this
revealed that in Melbourne in 2007–08 (based on a small sample) around 37 per cent
of dwellings sold were affordable by moderate income households. However, what
this data does not show is (a) where these properties are located and the implications
for policy and (b) the differences in household types in their ability to purchase across
different submarkets.
Thus, the next part of this study is to examine the differences in affordability across
metropolitan areas using the residual income method and again looking at the
circumstance of different household types. Given a methodology that is householdspecific in its measurement of affordability, the obvious hypothesis is that certain
household types have greater housing choice across the various submarkets than
others.
The two metropolitan areas we are looking at in this study are Melbourne and
Adelaide, and for each city their housing markets have been broken into broad
regional areas reflecting distance from the CBD. In Melbourne, because of its larger
geographical area, there are four areas: inner city, middle ring, outer urban and
growth area, and in Adelaide three: inner, middle and outer. The boundaries of these
areas are somewhat arbitrary and quite different from city to city as a result of their
different geographies, history and size. Figure 14 below shows the areas of the two
cities.
Development in Melbourne has taken place in a broad arc largely unimpeded by
geography, except of course by Port Phillip Bay. Unlike Sydney, Melbourne’s water
line is not penetrated by rivers and bays which greatly affect accessibility in that city.
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Nor is it hemmed in by mountain ranges except to the east where the urban fringe
runs into the Dandenongs. Adelaide, like Melbourne, is not hindered to any degree by
mountains except again to the east in the form of the Adelaide Ranges, and its flat
geography enables growth in any direction away from the coast on which it is located.
The geography of the two cities and their relative flatness mean that housing
submarkets are much less complex than, say, that of Sydney where the many rivers,
bays, inlets and hillier topography affect accessibility, attractiveness and amenity in
highly nuanced ways.
Figure 14: Regions of Adelaide and Melbourne, 2011

As in all Australian cities, much of inner Melbourne and Adelaide up to the 1980s was
given over to industry, including manufacturing and light engineering, and the inner
areas of mixed industrial and residential use in the post-war period were not seen as
desirable areas to live in, with property values reflecting this. At the same time, the
attractions of suburbia with the new house and car meant that the outer areas had
considerable demand (Forster 2004).
Over recent decades, the inner and middle ring suburbs of Australian cities have
become much more valued as places of residence. Households have changed their
perceptions of the more and less desirable places to live, while developers and
builders have to a degree responded with shifts in where new property is built and in
what form. The inner urban areas, in particular, have become much more attractive to
both households and developers; by contrast, outer urban living does not have the
same appeal as in the past and is seen by many to be increasingly problematic
(Dodson & Sipe 2008). As a result, most inner urban areas have now been gentrified
(Atkinson et al. 2011). This locational restructuring is explained by interrelated
demographic, social, economic and policy changes which have been identified
elsewhere (e.g. Flood & Baker 2009; Baum et al. 2006).
The important point is that these changes have been paralleled by, and perhaps
reinforced by, a fundamental restructuring of dwelling prices such that where inner
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urban areas were once the cheapest areas of a city they are now among the most
expensive.
As outlined in Burke and Hulse (2010), one long-established way of understanding the
dynamics of housing submarkets is through a bid rent curve which graphs variations
in land or property prices as distance increases from some point in a property market,
usually the CBD. The point at which rents or prices are most intense reflects the most
desirable locations (Alonso 1964). To illustrate both the concept and how
fundamentally Australian housing markets and associated household opportunities
have been restructured, Figure 15 below shows the bid rent or price curve for the
eastern corridor of Melbourne for 1981 and 2010.
Figure 15: Melbourne eastern corridor house price curve, 1981 and 2010 (2010 constant
prices)

Source: Victorian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 1981–2010 (unit record files)

In 1981, the eastern corridor house price curve was relatively flat with a slight bulge in
the affluent middle ring suburbs of Hawthorn and Camberwell. Inner urban Richmond
was slightly cheaper than Bayswater, 28 kilometres from the CBD.
By 2010, prices were much higher in general but considerably so in the inner and
middle ring suburbs, with the suburbs toward the fringe being dramatically lower. The
bulge in the middle ring suburbs, particularly those eight to 12 kilometres from the
CBD, has become much more marked, reflecting the increasing premium on CBD
access. This pattern was little different across the other corridors of Melbourne (Hulse
& Burke 2010) and suggests spatial polarisation of the housing market in that
households had a wide choice of affordable properties in 1981 but by 2010, for those
on more moderate incomes, the choices were much more limited, the degree to which
is assessed below.
Adelaide traces a different pattern to Melbourne but does not invalidate the price
curve thesis that properties should be more expensive closer to the city. The price in
both cases is for houses only, in recognition that Adelaide does not have many
apartments while Melbourne, notably in the inner city, does, and therefore an alldwelling comparison would not be appropriate. Melbourne house prices are higher
than Adelaide’s at any distance from the city and have that bulge in the middle
suburbs, while those of Adelaide decline progressively from the CBD until about 12
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kilometres out where they have a slight kick up and then trail away again, but only
moderately. The premium on proximity to the CBD has worn off much earlier in
Adelaide than in Melbourne, which is what one would expect in a smaller city.
Figure 16: Adelaide and Melbourne house price curves: Corridors in 1981 and 2008
(2008 constant prices)

Source: Victorian and South Australian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files)

With this brief context, we can now look at the degree to which different households
(assuming first-time ownership) are constrained in their ability to purchase across
these broad regional areas.
By taking the residual income and associated mortgage capacity for a given
household type and applying the modelled mortgage capacity to the Valuer General’s
unit record sales data for each jurisdiction, it is possible to determine where
households for any given income can purchase. Figure 17 below uses the Valuer
General’s data for Melbourne and Adelaide to overview their respective total markets
prior to regional analysis. In Melbourne the data is for all properties while for Adelaide
it is for houses only. The analysis is undertaken again with just two household types
(singles and childless couples) who are potential first-time purchasers.
The figure highlights two major points. The first (reaffirming what the modelled data in
Section 6.1 suggests) is that first-time ownership for families is difficult. In both
markets, nothing in 2010 was affordable by a couple with two children before around
$75 000 was earned, and even $90 000 could purchase less than 20 per cent of the
market. Only when income exceeds $100 000 in Adelaide and $115 000 in Melbourne
is at least 50 per cent of the market available. For singles the market is much more
affordable and the entry point is around $40 000 to $45 000 but improves substantially
over $60 000. The second point is that Adelaide not surprisingly is more affordable
than Melbourne, but more so for higher income earners of either family type,
suggesting a flatter market in Adelaide such that those on higher incomes have more
choice. The lower 40 per cent of the market is much more similar for both cities.
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Figure 17: Affordable housing in Melbourne and Adelaide: Singles and couples with two
children, MCBS, 2010

Source: South Australian and Victorian Valuer Generals’ Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files)
(mortgage to purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate. 25-year loan period. 10%
deposit)

This aggregated data still does not tell us about the submarkets, so let’s now make
that switch.
Figures 18 and 19 below show the percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to a
single first-time purchaser (Figure 18) and a couple with two children (Figure 19),
revealing the degree to which few properties are affordable for either household type
anywhere below $50 000 ($80 000 for the family) and the differences between regions
in affordability generally and between household types. The growth areas of
Melbourne are almost universally affordable for both household types so long as they
have around $85 000 household income, but affordability drops away sharply for inner
city and middle ring locations where families need an income of $120 000 plus to have
any real market choice.
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Figure 18: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to single person households,
MCBS, 2010

Figure 19: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable to couple with two children,
MCBS, 2010

Source: Victorian Valuer Generals’ Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit)

The information in Figures 18 and 19 is given sharper resolution in Table 13 which
shows for singles, couples and couples with two children the proportion of properties
available in each of the regions and for different income levels, but this time compared
with the 30 per cent rule (disposable income). This shows a reasonable degree of
similarity between the two methods for singles. For example, at $50 000, 27 per cent
of properties are available using the MCBS and 28 per cent using disposable income.
But, of course, singles do not have other household members to divert potential
housing expenditure, and thus when we go to couples with two children at $50 000
there is nothing affordable on the LCBS, while the 30 per cent rule would say that 44
per cent of the stock is affordable. The second point is that regional differences are
less sharp for singles and to a lesser degree couples than for families (couple and two
children). Thus, at $60 000 for a single on the MCBS, 79 per cent of the fringe is
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affordable, and 37 per cent of the inner city and 30 per cent of the middle ring.
However, it takes up to $100 000 for a family to have any real choice at all, with most
of that being on the fringe (90%) and outer suburbs (86%). Most importantly, the data
reaffirms the affordability problems of lower income households. Below $40 000 for all
three family types, using the MCBS, virtually nothing is purchasable where the 30/40
rule would say there is, and ironically most so for families. Note that the shading in
Table 13 identifies income level and location combinations that are highly
unaffordable.
Table 13: Percentage of Melbourne properties affordable for purchase to singles,
couples and couples with two children, using MCBS and 30 per cent disposable income
rule, 2010
30% rule: disposable income, single
person household

Single MCBS
Inner

Middle

Outer

$10,000

0%

0%

0%

$20,000

0%

0%

$30,000

0%

0%

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

1%

0%

1%

1%

1%

0%

0%

0%

5%

2%

3%

4%

3%

$40,000

5%

2%

3%

4%

3%

9%

5%

11%

19%

11%

$50,000

16%

11%

30%

44%

27%

17%

11%

32%

46%

28%

$60,000

37%

30%

69%

79%

55%

20%

14%

39%

54%

33%

$75,000

62%

61%

92%

93%

78%

43%

36%

77%

84%

61%

$100,000

81%

85%

98%

98%

91%

62%

61%

92%

93%

78%

$150,000

93%

96%
100%
99%
Couple MCBS

97%

82%
86%
98%
98%
92%
30% rule: disposable income, couple

Inner

Middle

$10,000

0%

0%

$20,000

0%

0%

$30,000

0%

$40,000

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

0%

0%

0%

3%

1%

0%

0%

0%

6%

2%

0%

0%

0%

0%

8%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$50,000

4%

1%

2%

3%

$60,000

17%

11%

32%

$75,000

50%

45%

$100,000

79%

$150,000

93%

Fringe

Melb.

2%

2%

2%

4%

5%

4%

4%

7%

13%

8%

11%

6%

15%

24%

15%

2%

20%

13%

38%

53%

32%

46%

28%

24%

16%

46%

61%

38%

84%

88%

68%

48%

42%

82%

87%

66%

82%

97%

98%

90%

67%

68%

94%

95%

82%

96%

100%

99%

97%

84%
87%
98%
98%
93%
30% rule: disposable income, couple with
two children
Inner
Middle
Outer
Fringe Melb.

Couple with two children, MCBS
Inner

Middle

$10,000

0%

0%

$20,000

0%

$30,000

Outer

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

0%

0%

0%

8%

3%

7%

12%

7%

0%

0%

0%

0%

11%

6%

14%

22%

14%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

14%

8%

22%

34%

21%

$40,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

18%

12%

33%

48%

29%

$50,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

28%

21%

54%

68%

44%

$60,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

31%

24%

60%

73%

48%

$75,000

7%

3%

6%

11%

7%

50%

45%

84%

88%

68%

$100,000

53%

49%

86%

90%

71%

68%

70%

95%

95%

83%

$150,000

87%

91%

99%

99%

95%

84%

87%

98%

98%

93%
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Tables 14 and 15 below provide another way of looking at the affordability problem,
showing for all properties in Melbourne and for houses only in Adelaide (here there
are too few apartments to provide meaningful data) the income that is necessary to
afford the median dwelling in each of the regions of the two cities using the LCBS.
One interesting observation is that while a single person needs an income of $89 000
to buy in inner Melbourne, they need $105 000 in inner Adelaide. This highlights an
important point, discussed in Section 9, as to the need for dwelling diversity.
Melbourne, compared to Adelaide, had the advantage of the flat boom in the 1960s
and 1970s that provided substantial diversity of stock which, to a large extent,
Adelaide missed out on, with its much more compact urban form at that time not
acting as a driver for as much multi-unit accommodation. On top of that has been the
one and two-bedroom high rise boom in Melbourne since the early 1990s which is
now beginning to appear on a much lesser scale in Adelaide. But without that diversity
in the inner city of Adelaide, purchasers have to look to more expensive detached
housing for choice. This is a problem that growth areas on the fringes of Melbourne
and Adelaide are in danger of replicating.
It is in the middle ring suburbs that Adelaide achieves its affordability. There the
median is only $455 000 compared to Melbourne’s $620 000, this amount
representing for any household type, but particularly moderate income families, a
major affordability barrier. Many moderate income households in Adelaide can still
enjoy the benefits of purchase reasonably close to the city, whereas those in
Melbourne cannot.
Table 14: Income required to purchase median priced dwelling, Melbourne regions,
2010
Median dwelling price
Single

Inner
$585,200

Middle
$620,000

Outer
$420,000

Fringe
$377,000

Melbourne
$460,000

$89,000

$94,000

$70,000

$65,000

$74,000

Sole parent 1 child

$100,000

$104,000

$77,000

$72,000

$82,000

Sole parent 2 children

$117,000

$121,000

$92,000

$87,000

$97,000

$95,000

$99,000

$78,000

$73,000

$82,000

Couple 1 child

$110,000

$114,000

$90,000

$85,000

$94,000

Couple 2 children

$123,000

$127,000

$102,000

$95,000

$109,000

Couple 3 children

$142,000

$147,000

$123,000

$118,000

$128,000

Couple

Source: Victorian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit)

Table 15: Income required to purchase median priced dwelling, Adelaide regions, 2010
Median dwelling price

Inner
$710,000

Middle
$455,000

Outer
$321,500

Adelaide
$400,000

Single

$105,000

$74,000

$59,000

$68,000

Sole parent 1 child

$116,000

$81,000

$66,000

$75,000

Sole parent 2 children

$133,000

$96,000

$80,000

$89,000

Couple

$109,000

$81,000

$67,000

$75,000

Couple 1 child

$124,000

$93,000

$79,000

$88,000

Couple 2 children

$137,000

$108,000

$89,000

$98,000

Couple 3 children

Outside
scope

$127,000

$109,000

$121,000

Source: South Australian Valuer General’s Property Sales Statistics 2010 (unit record files) (mortgage to
purchase affordable properties assumes 7.4% interest rate, 25-year loan period, 10% deposit)

48

In summary, what this exploratory analysis tells us to date for first-time buyers is:
 The residual income measure suggests (compared to the benchmark method) that

capacity to pay (and therefore potential demand) is greater than thought, for some
household types more than 50 per cent greater.
 The greater capacity to purchase comes from smaller (childless) households on

relatively good incomes.
 Low income families (i.e. those below income of $40 000) in Melbourne and

Adelaide are now completely out of the first home purchase market. Virtually
nothing is affordable. Low income singles and couples (same income) still have
opportunities for purchase, but these are spatially constrained and likely to be for
older lower quality flats rather than new demand.
 Moderate income families ($40 000 to $80 000) can still purchase, but only in very

spatially constrained markets, largely in outer suburbs (Adelaide and Melbourne)
and the fringes of metropolitan Melbourne.
 Moderate income singles (same income as above) have much greater dwelling

choice and can still purchase in the inner city and middle ring.
 Higher income families ($80 000 plus) have much increased choice although

substantially more so once household incomes exceed $100 000, when at least
50 per cent of inner city and middle ring properties in Melbourne are affordable.
 For higher income singles and couples, the world is their oyster; once an income

of $80 000 plus is achieved, substantial choice becomes available in both cities.
 The broadest lesson here is that if you want to be a first-time home owner in the

inner city or middle ring suburbs, particularly in Melbourne, do not have children.
Of course, these observations have to be modified for second and subsequent
purchasers who have built up a sizeable equity in their existing property, but in terms
of first-time home purchase demand this analysis enables us to understand the
Melbourne and Adelaide housing markets, and no doubt other Australian housing
markets, much better. It is an understanding that the residential development sector
appears to already have, given what they are currently building.
The big market for new construction in the inner city and middle ring is for one and
two-bedroom apartments as these can be built for around $350 000 to $600 000
(around $1700 per square metre building cost) for which there is still sizeable
purchase capacity among moderate to high income singles and couples. Larger
apartments can rarely be built for less than this and, if they were, the price of
$600 000 plus is not affordable for the household types that would desire such
accommodation (i.e. families). Detached dwellings and large townhouses anywhere
other than on the fringe have relatively limited new demand from first-time buyers. The
demand has to largely come from existing owners who already have substantial
equity.
The market for family accommodation (i.e. detached dwellings, townhouses or larger
apartments) can only be in outer areas where in Melbourne, for example, it is still
possible to purchase a house and land package for $350 000 to $550 000, which is
affordable by families with household income in excess of $90 000.
This all suggests a market driven by differential affordability across household types
which has important implications for urban form (and planning) as well as for the
occupants of the dwellings that make up this urban form. These implications are
drawn out in Section 9.

49

7

THE RENTAL MODEL

In broad terms, the model for the rental market is the same as for home purchaser
affordability. The difference is that because more tenants than purchasers are on low
incomes, many households are entitled to pensions and benefits which in some cases
become the dominant sources of income. The model therefore has to be adjusted for
all the permutation of pensions and benefits as affected by age of applicants, number
of children and relevant income eligibility tapers and cut-off points as incomes rise.
Among such benefits is the CRA, and this too has to be factored in, given certain
assumptions (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the treatment of pensions and
benefits, and Appendix 4 for CRA).
The data analysis here relates only to the Melbourne rental market for which detailed
unit record data is available by rent, location, property type and bedroom size. This
market has broadly been swept up in the market restructuring outlined in relation to
home ownership reviewed in Section 5.1, but the impacts do not play out in quite the
same way. Between 1945 and 1980, a disproportionate amount of Melbourne’s rental
stock was located in the inner urban areas, largely due to an intensive period of
flat/apartment development in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly in the form of one and
two-bedroom units (Archer 1980). In 1981 for example, 44 per cent of inner
Melbourne stock was private rental, with another 9.5 per cent public housing (Burke et
al. 1985, ch.1). Most of this was apartments, although around Melbourne University
and RMIT there was a sizeable stock of older terrace houses used as cheap student
rental.
By 2006, the rental stock in the inner city had fallen in relative terms but still was
larger in absolute numbers than in 1981, with some major transformations. New
commercial and residential areas (Southbank and Docklands) around the CBD have
been developed since the late 1980s with much of this new stock being high rise,
some of which was relatively expensive rental. Much of the rental stock made up of
old houses in the inner area has been converted to expensive owner-occupied
dwellings or pulled down and replaced with expensive townhouses. Both reflect the
gentrification processes impacting on the area. Many of the now 30- to 40-year-old
‘six-pack’ apartments (two storeys, with six to eight units compressed onto one block
of land) have been moved up market by virtue of renewal or simply by intense price
pressures from the international student market and the growing number of young
professionals wanting to live and work in the now attractive lifestyle suburbs of the
inner city. However, they still represent some of Melbourne’s most affordable rental
stock, although the term ‘affordability’ is very much a relative one. As Atkinson et al.
(2011, p.30) found, the displacement rate of private renters in inner Melbourne in
response to gentrification pressures does not mean displacement to the urban fringe
but to areas contiguous to the inner city. This suggests the hypothesis that there is a
much flatter bid rent curve for the rental market than that of the purchase market,
meaning that the lower cost rental stock is slowly moving to the outer suburbs but is
not yet concentrated in these locations as is the purchase stock. More often than not,
rental stock beyond the inner city is in the form of a detached dwelling that three or
more decades ago would have been constructed for ownership. More generally, and
as part of an Australia-wide process, the stock of lower end rental accommodation in
Melbourne is contracting, with pressures on rents and problems of availability (Wulff et
al. 2011).
Figure 20 below shows the rent curve for three-bedroom houses for the same corridor
of Melbourne as used for home purchase (Figure 15) and confirms that, as yet, the
market restructuring of Melbourne has not hit the rental market to the same degree.
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Rent levels in real terms have been pushed up for the full length of the corridor and
more so for the inner and middle ring locations, but in the case of the latter nowhere
near as much as for dwelling prices.
Figure 20: Melbourne eastern corridor rent curve: Three-bedroom houses, 2000 and
2010 (2010 constant prices)

7.1

Rental affordability

Figure 21 below shows, for a couple with two children, the difference the model
makes when applied to rental and again as compared with the benchmark method.
The rental model is more complex as CRA has to be modelled into the income
position with the effect of cut-ins, tapers and cut-outs of income support and benefits
such that the increase in incomes for any household type is not linear.
As with ownership, this data clearly reveals differences between the benchmark
model and the budget standard model. Using a couple with two children as the
example, it would suggest that above some income level, that is, $45 000 using the
LCBS but a high $90 000 using the MCBS, they can afford more by way of rent than
indicated by the benchmark method, with the difference widening as incomes
increase. By contrast, below some minimum level of income, again around $40 000,
the opposite holds true: the disposable income benchmark method (the one most
equivalent to the budget standard) overstates the degree of affordability. By contrast,
if the gross benchmark method is used, the LCBS and it are very similar.
Second, and related to these differences, is that the budget standard method offers a
better explanation of the rental market dynamics. One of the puzzles of recent years
has been how rents have been able to increase to the degree that they have done,
given the extent of income resistance that would be suggested by the benchmark
method, that is, lack of affordability should have acted as a drag on the rental market.
That this has not been the case is suggested by the budget standard method which
indicates an ability of a couple with two children on a household income over $45 000
(data not shown) to pay more than we previously thought was affordable. For singles,
this amount is $30 000 and, given that they are a sizeable proportion of rental
households, their market influence would be substantial.
Third, if the MCBS is used, a couple with two children on less than $60 000 has
minimum capacity to afford a rental property at all, and, if the LCBS is used, any rent
higher than $230 a week is unaffordable. In short, below a certain point the private
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market is effectively not accessible. This is really no surprise as awareness of the
problem of private rental housing failing to meet lower income needs was, back in the
1920s and 1930s, one of the major rationales for social housing provision in Australia
and internationally. Today the problem does not create the same immediacy for policy
action as it did then, perhaps because in that era the lack of affordability in private
rental was overlaid by problems of quality and slum formation (Harloe 1995, ch.3).
Also, the numbers of renters were much greater and the composition different, that is,
many more families, and perhaps because this is no longer the case the political risks
of inaction are lower.
Figure 21: Rental affordability using different affordability measures, couple with two
children

Source: Modelled data using SPRC budget standards indexed to 2010 using composite index

The test of the size of the affordability problem is to see what happens when the
modelled residual income data is applied to the actual housing market.
Victoria has a Residential Tenancies Bond Authority (RTBA) which holds all
residential tenancy bonds for rental properties, including long-term caravans and
rooming houses, houses and flats. The bonds are held in trust for landlords/agents
and tenants, or owners and residents, giving all parties an equal say in how they
should be repaid when a rental agreement (lease) ends. When a new lease is taken
on, the landlord or agent provides the RTBA with the bond along with information
including property type, number of bedrooms, rent and address. Confidentialised
RTBA unit records thus enable us to calculate for each household type the
percentage of appropriate dwelling units available for Melbourne, using the LCBS,
MCBS and 30/40 benchmark method.
The following tables analyse a single person childless couple and a couple with two
children, and apply the Canadian National Occupancy Standard which has been used
to set minimum standards for each household type. Thus a couple with two children,
in addition to facing an affordability constraint, face an availability one as they are
ineligible for one or two-bedroom properties under this standard.4 The data does not
include boarding houses as a potential option as these are deemed not to be long4

This ignores the Canadian rule that children under 18 of the same sex can share a bedroom.
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term rental. The postcodes of the rental addresses have been amalgamated into
inner, middle, outer and fringe areas of Melbourne on the same basis as the purchase
regions (see Appendix 3). Relevant rent assistance is factored into the residual
income model on the formula provided in Appendix 4.
Table 16 below highlights how sensitive the analysis is to the chosen budget standard
and illustrates the problem of which to choose to reflect market and household
realities. Taking the example of a couple on $40 000, if the LCBS is used, 71 per cent
of all rental stock is affordable, but only 2 per cent if the MCBS is used. Above
$60 000 (or in reality somewhere between $50 000 and $75 000), the results from
each of the methods become much closer, illustrating that this income range is a
transition zone between having affordability pressures and not. For subsequent
analysis (with the exception of Table 16) we will use the harsher measure (the LCBS)
and compare it to the most equivalent benchmark method, disposable income. Note
that shading in Table 16 identifies income level and location combinations that are
highly unaffordable.
Table 16: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, LCBS and MCBS,
Melbourne, couple, 2010
Income

LCBS

MCBS

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

$0

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$10,000

4%

8%

12%

8%

8%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$20,000

15%

25%

45%

44%

30%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$30,000

28%

46%

76%

76%

52%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$40,000

44%

68%

92%

91%

71%

1%

2%

4%

2%

2%

$50,000

57%

78%

96%

96%

80%

5%

10%

14%

12%

10%

$60,000

85%

94%

99%

99%

94%

52%

74%

94%

94%

76%

$75,000

96%

98%

100%

100%

98%

88%

95%

100%

99%

95%

$100,000

99%

100%

100%

100%

100%

98%

99%

100%

100%

99%

Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard

Table 17 below illustrates a story that is rarely told for lack of comparative data, and
that is the relative affordability of rental versus ownership. On the supply side, the
data is as good as one can get, including all properties for sale and all new rental
properties in Melbourne in 2010. On the demand side, it is the same income available
for rent or purchase as both use the MCBS which adjusts both incomes for all relevant
income additions and losses (i.e. taxation).
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Table 17: Percentage of affordable purchase and rental properties by region, Melbourne,
MCBS Couple, 2010
Income

MCBS purchase

MCBS rental

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

$10,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$20,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$30,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

$40,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

$50,000

4%

1%

2%

$60,000

17%

11%

$75,000

50%

$100,000

79%

$150,000

93%

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

1%

2%

4%

2%

2%

3%

2%

5%

10%

14%

12%

10%

32%

46%

28%

52%

74%

94%

94%

76%

45%

84%

88%

68%

88%

95%

100%

99%

95%

82%

97%

98%

90%

98%

99%

100%

100%

99%

96%

100%

99%

97%

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

In this table, we can use a couple as an example and compare for any level of income
the different affordability offered by tenure across Melbourne. Below $40 000, the
situation is grim, with neither rental nor purchase possible at an MCBS level. Above
$50 000, 10 per cent of the rental market is affordable but only 2 per cent of the
purchase market. Thereafter, the situation changes dramatically, notably for renters.
At $60 000 household income, 76 per cent of all properties are rentable but only 28
per cent for purchase. At $75 000, a couple have almost complete choice in rental and
68 per cent choice in purchase. The real difference is spatial where, from $50 000
upwards, opportunities open up for rental in the inner city and middle ring, but these
properties are still constrained for purchase (e.g. 74% at $60 000 in the middle ring for
rental but only 11% for purchase). The relative affordability of rental compared to
purchase in inner city and middle ring locations suggests why many households
cannot make the transition to purchase. For those with employment, family or
community connections in the inner city, the only way to retain these is through rental.
But even for, say, professionals on higher income who want to live in the inner city
(perhaps for lifestyle choice as much as employment or family reasons), the choices
offered by rental are much greater. A $75 000 income for a couple will give them a
choice of 95 per cent of middle ring rental properties and 88 per cent of inner, where
the respective percentages for purchase are 45 per cent and 55 per cent. The
problem here is that as more and more of the higher income professionals remain in
inner area rental for reasons of inability to purchase in their preferred lifestyle
locations, they are occupying stock once used as lower income rental
accommodation. The pressures on lower cost rental stock, as captured in Wulff et al.’s
(2011) study, are intense.
Tables 18, 19 and 20 return to the LCBS, which some would argue is more
appropriate for rental. Not surprisingly, these show some similar features to the
purchase data, but not as sharp. For example, for all three household types there are
spatial constraints across the regional submarkets but to a lesser degree than
purchase; more affordable rental accommodation is available in inner city and middle
ring locations and at lower levels of income. For example, while virtually nothing is
purchasable for any household below $50 000 in the inner city, this income level
offers wide choice for single renters (76%) and even some choice for families (16%).
The second point is the very big difference in affordability outcomes between
household types when the LCBS is compared to the 30 per cent benchmark. For
singles, the LCBS suggests much greater availability over $40 000 across all regions,
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while under the benchmark method there is no real availability until $75 000. On the
other hand, a couple and two children have much less availability up to $50 000 using
the LCBS than the benchmark method, and what is available is disproportionately in
the outer suburbs and fringe. In short, the benchmark method suggests a significant
overstatement of rental choices for families.
The third point follows from the point about where the stock is available. For lower
income renter families (i.e. those families on less than $50 000), virtually nothing is
available in the inner city and only a small amount (21% at $40 000) the middle ring.
What the LCBS indicates is effective choice over $40 000 in the outer suburbs and
fringe, meaning that the rental affordability patterns are beginning to mirror those of
purchase. Moderate income renting families can only locate in outer areas that are
also the domain of moderate income purchasers.
A final point, and perhaps the most compelling, is that below the $40 000 household
income point for singles (LCBS) and $30 000 for families there is minimal
accommodation in the private rental market, even factoring in CRA. Only couples on
low incomes appear to have some choice.
Table 18: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, single
person, 2010
Income

LCBS

30% disposable income

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

$0

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

1%

2%

3%

1%

2%

$10,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

4%

7%

4%

4%

$20,000

2%

4%

7%

4%

4%

3%

6%

9%

6%

6%

$30,000

4%

8%

11%

8%

7%

0%

1%

1%

0%

1%

$40,000

43%

66%

91%

90%

69%

1%

3%

4%

2%

2%

$50,000

76%

90%

99%

99%

90%

4%

8%

12%

8%

8%

$60,000

90%

96%

100%

100%

96%

11%

18%

31%

29%

21%

$75,000

97%

99%

100%

100%

99%

26%

43%

72%

72%

49%

$100,000

99%

100%

100%

100%

100%

57%

78%

96%

96%

80%

Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard

Table 19: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, couple, 2010
Income

LCBS

30% disposable income

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

$0

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

4%

8%

11%

8%

7%

$10,000

4%

8%

12%

8%

8%

11%

17%

29%

28%

19%

$20,000

15%

25%

45%

44%

30%

13%

21%

39%

37%

25%

$30,000

28%

46%

76%

76%

52%

19%

30%

53%

53%

36%

$40,000

44%

68%

92%

91%

71%

21%

33%

59%

60%

40%

$50,000

57%

78%

96%

96%

80%

7%

12%

19%

17%

13%

$60,000

85%

94%

99%

99%

94%

19%

30%

53%

53%

36%

$75,000

96%

98%

100%

100%

98%

38%

61%

88%

88%

65%

$100,000

99%

100%

100%

100%

100%

67%

85%

98%

98%

86%

Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard
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Table 20: Percentage of affordable rental properties by region, Melbourne, couple with
two children, 2010
Income

LCBS

30% disposable income

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

Inner

Middle

Outer

Fringe

Melb.

$0

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

14%

52%

61%

38%

$10,000

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

4%

29%

75%

80%

55%

$20,000

2%

4%

14%

22%

12%

5%

37%

82%

86%

62%

$30,000

2%

11%

43%

53%

32%

5%

42%

86%

89%

65%

$40,000

3%

21%

66%

72%

48%

6%

45%

88%

90%

68%

$50,000

16%

69%

97%

97%

81%

10%

59%

95%

95%

76%

$60,000

40%

87%

99%

99%

90%

16%

69%

97%

97%

81%

$75,000

75%

95%

100%

100%

96%

22%

78%

98%

98%

85%

$100,000

91%

98%

100%

100%

99%

19%

73%

98%

98%

83%

Source: RTBA unit record files and relevant budget standard

In summary, the application of the residual income model to private rental draws out
broadly similar findings to those of purchase:
 Over a certain income level, singles have more capacity to afford rental

accommodation than families.
 Families (represented in the modelling by a couple and two children) have a much

greater affordability problem than suggested by the 30 per cent rule.
 Below certain income levels (containing still sizeable numbers of households, as

Figure 13 indicates), there is no accommodation available in Melbourne that is
affordable.
 While not as marked as purchase, the rental market is more affordable in outer

and fringe areas, and this is where all households have greater choice once a
certain income level is achieved.
 The inner city and middle ring are highly problematic in terms of affordable

housing.
 Families are constrained in choice, not just because of rent levels but also type of

dwelling. Part of the reason for families having little choice in inner areas is the
application of the Canadian National Occupancy Standard to the data which
assumes it is inappropriate for families to live in one and two-bedroom
accommodation.
The implications of these findings are discussed in Section 9.
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8

SOCIAL HOUSING

One of the other objectives of this study was to test the appropriateness of the
residual income model for social housing rent setting.
Social housing in Australia comprises a number of sectors: public housing, community
housing including the growth associations, Indigenous housing and affordable
housing. The largest sector by far is public housing, and the rental system within this
sector has largely become the norm for the others. However, each sector differs in
some way from this norm and together they illustrate a range of possible variations to
rental systems within social housing in response to different financial, social and
political imperatives.
The current public housing rent-setting structure around Australia is a household rent,
usually referred to as a ‘rebated rent’ or an ‘income related rent’, which is based on
the income of each tenant. While the formula used to calculate household rents varies
between state housing authorities, most apply an upper benchmark of 25 per cent (up
to 30% in New South Wales) of income. However, the treatment of Centrelink family
payments and the income of other residents can vary, which means that there can be
variations around the upper benchmark for different household types. For those on
higher incomes there is also a property rent in the form of a quasi-market rent which
represents the upper limit that a household can pay.
Rent setting in social housing (predominantly public housing until the 1990s) has
traced a complex history of property and household rents, with cost rents being
dominant for most households until the 1980s but overlaid by a household rent for
those whose circumstances had changed and who could no longer pay a cost rent
(McNelis & Burke 2005). In earlier years, household rents varied around much lower
benchmarks than at present, but with financial viability increasingly threatened by the
greater targeting that started in the 1980s (accelerating greatly from the mid-1990s),
these were slowly pushed up to their current 25 per cent. The financial viability
problem derives from the fact that the cost of the rebate (the difference between
market-derived rents and household rents) is largely the direct responsibility of state
housing authorities, with neither Commonwealth nor state governments reimbursing
them for the difference between property rents and household rents.
Australia, New Zealand and the USA are the only developed societies operating a
household rent which keeps rents for individual households to some defined
benchmark (McNelis & Burke 2005). Most others charge only a property rent, with
eligible tenants receiving a housing allowance calibrated according to different types
and sizes of households and different regional rents using implicit benchmarks. This
aims to achieve the intended level of affordability for groups of households with
common characteristics rather than as a function of the particular circumstances of
individual households. And, by virtue of the housing agency receiving a property rent
that covers costs, there are not the financial pressures which Australian social
housing agencies, most crucially public agencies, confront in striking a balance
between financial viability and household affordability. In Australia this is not an easy
balance as there is no guarantee that the high benchmark (25% to 30%) required for
financial viability will guarantee affordability for households, particularly given that, as
this report has stressed, benchmark rents do not recognise the different expenditure
requirements of different household types.
Table 21 below illustrates the problem for housing agencies. This shows, for a range
of household types and different combinations of age and children, the relevant
statutory income (column 4) and budget standard (LCBS). By deducting the LCBS
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from the residual income, the difference in principle is what should be available for
rent. With the exception of older couples and sole parents with one or two young
children, the statutory benefit is not enough to meet the budget standard, let alone pay
rents. This would suggest that, for these family types, rents should be set at zero.
If Table 6 did not highlight this point sufficiently (69% of public tenants were below the
LCBS), Table 21 does. This table shows for four household types and different age
combinations of children the statutory income (column 4) and the actual budget
standard (column 5). For singles (40 years of age), couples (same) and couples with
two children, the statutory benefit is not enough to meet the budget standard, let alone
pay rents. This in part is a function of indexing, given that statutory incomes are
indexed by the CPI and the budget standard by the composite index method, with the
latter increasing at a more rapid rate than the CPI. Accepting this method of indexing
would suggest that, for these family types, rents should be set at zero and for the
others at no more than $124 (for older couples). If a CPI measure was used, the
LCBS would be reduced by around 15 per cent (see Appendix 2), but even this would
produce rents that are below current household rents for most household types.
Some, including one of this report’s authors (Burke 2005), have suggested extending
rent assistance to public housing tenants and this would certainly help the financial
status of housing agencies (so long as NAHA funds were not withdrawn in the same
proportion). Some tenants on full Centrelink incomes would still find themselves in a
difficult financial position while others, for example aged couples, would be quite
financially comfortable, particularly compared to private renters in the same age and
pension categories.
Thus, in terms of the objective of testing the appropriateness of the residual income
model for social housing rent setting, the answer is simple: it would not work for social
housing agencies although it would work for most tenants. If rents were set at the
budget standard for public housing, the levels that they would be set at for tenant
affordability would greatly worsen the financial viability for housing agencies. Into the
bargain, a residual income rent remains a household rent, with all its administrative
costs and work disincentive implications of a household rent that changes as income
changes.
Table 21: Statutory incomes compared to LCBS for various household types, 2010
1
Household type

2
Adults’ age

Single
Couple

3
Children’s
age

4
Statutory
income

5
BS
amount

6
Potential
rent (4-5)

40

$231

$278

-47

65

$351

$276

75

40, 40

$418

$421

-3

$529

$405

124

Couple, 1 child

65, 65
40, 40

8

$566

$562

4

Couple, 2 children

40, 40

8, 10

$659

$664

-5

Couple, 3 children

40, 40

8, 10, 12

$759

$756

3

Sole parent,
1 child

40

8

$398

$353

45

Sole parent,
2 children

40

8, 10

$492

$473

19

Source: Centrelink 2010 LCBS modelling
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This does not invalidate the residual income method for getting a more subtle
understanding of the household-specific implications of the current rent-setting model.
Thus, not all tenants are on a maximum Centrelink income, many will combine
elements of such an income with other income sources, and some will be on full
employed incomes. Table 21 repeats the above exercise for households on Victorian
Office of Housing maximum income eligibility and shows what rent they could afford to
pay using the LCBS (column 8). This highlights the problem of a household rent on a
relatively flat percentage amount. Those on very low incomes may be paying an
excessive amount on rents and not leaving enough for other expenditure, while those
on higher incomes in most cases have more than enough to live on after paying the
25 per cent household rent (as compared with what they would be paying with the
LCBS). Sole parents in particular are doing relatively nicely. On the other hand, the
household rent for couples with large families (four children) appears too harsh and
does not leave enough to meet the LCBS. They are $68 out of pocket, whereas sole
parents have between $285 and $190 more relative to what the LCBS rent would be,
depending on the number of children.
Table 22: Victorian Office of Housing maximum income eligibility, household rent and
LCBS, comparative analysis for selected household types, 2010
6
Public
housing
LCBS
rent

7
Public
housing
rent, 25%
benchmark
method

8
LCBS rent/
public
housing
rent
difference

1
Household
type

2 Adults’
age

Single

40

$470

$278

$192

$118

74

65*

$470

$276

$194

$118

76

40, 40

$816

$421

$395

$204

191

65,65*

$816

$405

$411

$204

207

Couple

3
Children’s
age

4
Public
housing
maximum
eligible
income

5
LCBS

Couple, 1
child

40,40

8

$850

$562

$288

$212

76

Couple, 2
children

40,40

8,10

$884

$664

$220

$221

1

Couple, 3
children

40,40

8,10,12

$918

$756

$162

$230

-68

Sole parent,
1 child

40

8

$850

$353

$497

$212

285

Sole parent,
2 children

40

8,10

$884

$473

$411

$221

190

In the interests of vertical equity (between lower and higher income tenants in public
housing), this would suggest an increase in the proportion of rent required for each
household type as income increases. While superficially equitable, such a rent
increase creates a potentially greater welfare trap by virtue of the workforce
disincentive build in to sharper rent tapers. It would also be even more
administratively burdensome than the current model and, as targeting bears its impact
on tenancy mix over time and more and more households are at the low end of the
income range, for example 100 per cent Centrelink income dependent, then any
restructuring of rents along these lines would probably be financially problematic for
social housing agencies. This would likely occur because the proportion of
households requiring a rent increase and contributing to revenue would be more than
negated by those requiring a reduction. In short, this exploration of the implications of
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the residual income model only adds to the evidence that the current mix of a flat 25
per cent household rent and a market rent is highly problematic for tenants and
housing organisations.
Turning to the NRAS, the budget standard model as applied to its income limits
suggests that the scheme is very well targeted as the point of eligibility. Table 23
below shows the initial income limits for NRAS eligibility for selected household types
as of June 2010. Initial eligibility is the maximum amount for a relevant household at
the point of allocation of a property (column 5). There is also an upper limit as to how
much the income can increase by over a two-year period without having to vacate an
NRAS property, but that is not relevant to the assessment of initial targeting.
The table shows the residual income measure for each household type (column 5)
and deducts this from column 6 to produce an amount that would be the desired rent
to meet MCBS requirements. The MCBS estimates (which would exclude CRA) would
appear to be close to the market rents less 25 per cent in most capital cities. For
example, looking at a childless couple in their 40s, the MCBS rent (the amount they
should pay as CRA goes to the provider) is $284. In Melbourne in December 2010 the
median rent for a two-bedroom flat was $340. Discounted by 25 per cent as required
by NRAS, the rent is $255, not too far from what the LCBS would suggest. For a large
family (couple with four children) the 75 per cent discounted median December rent
for a four-bedroom house is $290 and the LCBS suggests they should be paying
$305—again very close. If only public housing, and perhaps by default community
housing, rent could be as well targeted to what households can actually afford! Into
the bargain, the NRAS rent structure (being a discounted market rent) has no inbuilt
work disincentives.
Table 23: NRAS maximum income eligibility and MCBS rent applied to NRAS eligibility,
June 2010
1
Household
income
composition

2
Household type

3
Adult’s age

100%
income

Single

5
NRAS
maximum
income
eligibility

6
MCBS

7
MCBS
rent (5–
6)

40

681

397

284

Single

65

681

382

299

Couple

40, 40

$894

$610

$284

65, 65

$894

$555

$339

$1,152

$816

$336
$368

Couple, 1 child

60/40%

40, 40

4
Children’s
age

8

Couple, 2 children

40, 40

8, 10

$1,356

$988

Couple, 3 children

40, 40

8, 10,1 2

$1,554

$1,249

$305

Sole parent, 1 child

40

8

$928

$572

$356

Sole parent, 2
children

40

8, 10

$1,193
$781

$412

Couple

40, 40

$970

$610

$360

65, 65

$970

$555

$415

Couple, 1 child

40, 40

8

$1,204

$816

$388

Couple, 2 children

40, 40

8, 10

$1,430

$988

$442

Couple, 3 children

40, 40

8, 10, 12

$1,655

$1,249

$406
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

9

By its nature, this study was not designed to have a direct policy focus. The intention
was to explore the viability of an alternative method of measuring affordability (the
residual income method) to the ubiquitous 30 per cent benchmark method and to look
at how this might enrich our understanding around a range of affordability and housing
market issues. The work has been exploratory but reveals both the potential and the
limitations of the method.
For a broad measure of affordability (i.e. the scale of problems across all households),
the residual method provides results not too dissimilar to the benchmark method (12.6
% residual income, 14.3% benchmark method) and, given the ease which the latter
can be constructed and the complications with the residual method, we would
recommend its continued use.
However, in terms of compositional elements where the results are affected by the
type of households and their different expenditure and the make-up of these
household types in different tenures, then the residual income method is likely to be
more accurate in terms of the actual household experience. It is obvious, for example,
that large families will have higher expenses than smaller ones and that this will affect
their capacity to pay for housing.
This report offers no broad overall conclusions other than that above. Instead, there
are conclusions specific to each section and to the key questions to be addressed by
the study. The conclusions are thus pulled together in relation to these questions and
in part serve as a summary of results and in part an indicator of policy directions.
Some are speculative as it has to be remembered that this is not a full blown study of
all household types and all housing markets, but rather of a few case study
households and two metropolitan locations.

9.1

Using the method to measure the scale and form of the
problem

If we accept the residual income method as a complement to the benchmark, what
are some of the key findings in terms of the first objective set for its use, that is, to
calculate the distribution of housing affordability by household type, tenure, income,
state and type of purchasers?
1. For the lowest 40 per cent of household income earners, the 30/40 rule actually
understates the affordability problem. If we already thought it was bad, it is
actually worse, with the residual method showing 31 per cent of all Australian
households having an affordability problem. The degree to which this is a housing
cost versus an income distribution problem cannot be determined via this
research, although the residual income model could be used to show how
manipulations of housing costs or incomes could improve the financial position of
different household types.
It must be appreciated that in a highly marketised housing system with little notfor-profit housing (around 95% of Australian housing is market provided), the
percentages of lower income households with an affordability problem will always
be high as markets can never get rents or house prices to levels affordable for
such households. In the absence of a much larger not-for-profit sector, the
challenge is working out the mix of supply side and demand side subsidies that
can achieve the best affordability outcomes in the market sector. A starting point
suggested by the residual income method is to focus on those household types
and tenures that have the most intense affordability problems.
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2. Lack of affordability is an obvious personal hardship for these families but what
the findings hypothesise, given that almost a third of households have no
spending discretion after meeting the necessities of life and housing costs, is that
affordability may also be a drag on consumer spending and therefore on the
economy. The households have not the capacity to save or to drive consumer
spending.
3. It is the rental sector where the affordability problem is most intensely felt. Of the
779 853 lower 40 per cent income households, 51 per cent were renters, split
relatively evenly between private and public sectors.
4. The residual income method indicated that public renters can have an affordability
problem, but this is as much about low income as about rents and highlights the
problematic nature of social housing, particularly public housing, in Australia.
Rents are too high for many tenants but not high enough for the housing
organisations’ financial sustainability. Rental reform is necessary.
5. Among private renters, the stand-out group are aged singles and couples. The
numbers here are not huge and very few have the capacity to increase their
income in old age. But as other AHURI studies have pointed out, the numbers will
increase substantially over coming years. The solutions are always complex,
requiring new supply side housing forms and financial models, but on the income
side there is a strong case for some form of rent assistance top-up. We are only
talking about some 50 000 households and thus an additional budgetary outlay of
$125 million per annum if they were to receive another $50 a week. Ideally, such a
‘s’ would have performance requirements, for example housing quality, attached
to prevent exploitation.
6. What the latter point reveals, however, and one alluded to throughout the study, is
that the housing affordability problem is not just about housing costs. To expect
solutions in the housing domain only will not address much of the problem. The
relationships between income support programs and housing affordability
outcomes, and labour market programs (whereby households can increase their
earned income) and housing affordability, need greater understanding and
potential review.

9.2

How well or badly we perform in comparison to the USA

1. This short section highlighted the importance of understanding the broad
institutional environment when making comparisons between countries. While
Australia may come up badly on very raw measures of affordability, a more finegrained analysis that looks at income support schemes, housing market structure,
and household composition, may suggest that the situation is not as bad as it
seems. That is certainly the case in the Victoria/Massachusetts comparison. The
important point here is that this appears to have more to do with income support
programs and income distribution than housing market performance, reaffirming
point 5 above.
2. Reinforcing the point made in Section 9.1, where Australia does have a worse
affordability problem is for aged singles and couples.

9.3

Modelling affordability capacity by household type

1. The most important conclusion here is that the 30/40 method is not an adequate
tool for understanding affordability and the housing market implications. Different
household types have much greater capacity to participate in the housing market
than others, and this is important in understanding market dynamics.
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2. The residual method with a focus on specific household types can provide a better
understanding of the compositional make-up of the affordability problem and
suggests, among other things, the need for financial institution mortgage
calculators that recognise the different expenditure attributes of different
household types.
3. Below some income point (varying for each household type), but in some cases
(notably for families) higher than suggested by the 30/40 rule, no private market
housing is affordable, whether rental or purchase. What the modelling suggests is,
of course, consistent with the proportions of an affordability problem documented
in Section 5 and in other AHURI studies. The obvious point is that policy initiative
and reform is necessary, but what form this should take leaves considerable room
for debate.
4. Given the same income, singles and couples have much greater market capacity
to work within the high house prices and rents of the inner city and middle ring
suburbs and can purchase or rent at levels way beyond what the 30/40 rule would
tell us. The development industry has already worked this out, which explains the
proliferation of one and two-bedroom apartments in inner city and middle ring
Melbourne in the last decade.
5. The method enables the development of household-specific price points that can
be used by industry or government to identity the targeting of affordable housing
developments. This could be important where there is inclusionary zoning or
simply in government (state and local) negotiations with developers to include
some proportion of affordable housing. It provides a precise measure with
underlying rationale to say what that is, which was not previously the case.
6. By relating the affordability capacity to price points and then to the distribution of
renters’ incomes, it is possible to get some assessment of the potential size of the
first-time home purchase market. This exploratory exercise for the case study
households would suggest that current prices are at a level where this market is
very limited. We may have finally hit the affordability price wall.
7. The residual income method suggests that it is families that face the greatest
barriers to purchase, and yet for reasons such as the ontological security
ownership provides it is probably more important to encourage ownership for this
household type. One policy alternative is to target the FHOG to families only,
capped at different income levels for family size. Thus, for couples with two
children it could be capped at $100 000, as above that point there do not appear
to be any difficulties for a household of this type purchasing. For three children it
might be $105 000 and for one child $95 000, but with the residual income method
providing the information to set the amounts more precisely.
8. An alternative or complement might be the adaptation of rent assistance to a
parallel home purchase assistance program where the same or similar amounts to
CRA are made available to potential home purchasing households, but with
eligibility targeted only to families (income capped as above) and only for a fiveyear period (i.e. to get over the initial purchase hump), and most importantly as a
contingent payment to be repaid on sale out of any capital gains.

9.4

Affordability performance of home purchase markets on
a spatial basis

1. Using the Melbourne and Adelaide home purchase markets and applying the
residual income affordability to actual dwelling prices, we were able to document
the degree of market constraint for different household types. Lower income
families (below $40 000) are out of the market completely; only at around $60 000
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is there capacity to purchase, but then this applies only in outer suburbs and
growth areas. Singles and couples had much less constrained choice and those
with incomes below $80 000 were the only household type that could be first-time
home buyers in inner city and middle ring suburbs. These observations have to be
modified for second and subsequent purchasers who have built up a sizeable
equity in their existing property.
2. The differential choice of household types to purchase indicates a driver of spatial
polarisation that, in the absence of any policy interventions, is no doubt likely to be
sustained in the future. However, it is a nuanced polarisation, not simply one of
lower versus higher income but also of household and housing type. The outer
suburbs as a whole will not become dominated by low income households as
many of the larger households that are constrained or choose to live in such areas
because of their greater affordability and more appropriate dwellings (houses
rather than flats) still have objectively good incomes of $75 000 plus. In 15 years
or so, when these households’ mortgages reduce relative to hopefully rising
incomes, they will have substantial discretionary income to spend on goods and
services in these areas. And many who traced the same housing career a decade
or more ago probably already have.
This means that the outer suburbs will not trace the path of US inner cities where
concentrations of low income households undermine the viability of local industry
and create a pathway to concentrations of spatial disadvantage. This may occur in
limited areas of Australian outer suburbs where the particular nature of the stock,
that is, tired six-pack apartments, run-down detached dwellings and, in some
cases, ex-public housing stock, will attract ‘slum’ landlords, low income
purchasers and renters. These areas should be identified, the processes causing
change better understood and potential interventions designed.
Conversely, these processes do not mean that the inner and middle ring areas of
our cities are going to be concentrations of high income households. The growing
proportion of multi-unit accommodation that will be occupied by singles and
couples will ensure this. To purchase in such areas, these household types only
need an income much the same as, or even less than, the income needed by
larger households to purchase in the outer areas. Across Melbourne there may be
relatively even distribution of household incomes, but with very different household
compositions.
What will certainly occur, and is already occurring, in response to the current
market affordability is a polarisation of dwelling form and household type. Inner
city and middle ring housing will be increasingly dominated by multi-unit
development, often high rise and targeted at small households, while outer and
growth areas will be dominated by detached houses marketed at larger
households and only occasionally relieved by a small pocket of multi-unit housing.
3. The unintended side effect of the polarisation could be an inability for many outer
urban detached home owners to trade down or across. There has been a growing
assumption (in many countries, now undermined by the global financial crisis) that
home ownership could be a de facto form of welfare policy in that older
households could sell their outright owned property, trade down to a smaller
dwelling and have the residual as an income stream or de facto pension. In a
spatially divided housing market this will have only limited potential as already the
cost of apartments in the areas where they are largely available (inner city and
middle ring) are equal to or exceed outer urban detached housing. And in the
outer urban areas of Melbourne such is the focus on the larger household (family
market) that there is very limited construction of multi-unit housing. For example,
in 2009, of 17 628 dwelling permits for construction projects in these areas, 98.4
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per cent were for detached dwellings (Victorian Building Commission 2010).
Households in outer areas will not even be able to trade across to a more suitable
dwelling form as their housing circumstances change.
4. Until the outer urban households’ children leave home, or the households have
very large increases in income to sustain a much larger mortgage and/or build
very substantial equity, they are effectively trapped in space with little prospect of
moving into the inner and middle suburbs, such is the gap between what they can
afford and the value of dwellings in outer urban areas relative to those in the inner
city and middle ring areas. Compared to the housing market in Melbourne in the
1945–80 period when affordability was fairly uniform across space, the now
spatially constrained housing market is potentially limiting labour market mobility
(many people are less able to move around metropolitan areas) or accentuating
car use as many whose jobs are in inner urban locations are forced to live further
away from where they work and where there is poor public transport. Both
represent problems for urban sustainability.
5. A locking-in of two distinctively different residential construction industries
whereby there is a sector of small or contract builders specialising in the
techniques of single unit housing construction and a commercial multi-unit sector
specialising in four or more storeys, with the former tending to only operate in the
outer area and the latter only in the inner, where they both know their relevant
markets and the building techniques and funding mechanisms to make their
products work in those markets. In addition to the demand side constraints on
creating a more diverse housing form in the outer areas, this may create a supply
side constraint with few multi-unit builders with the interest or expertise to venture
into the outer areas. As Newton et al. (2011) observe, there is a shortage of high
quality low rise median density development in Australian cities, in part because
this specialisation of the two residential construction sectors.
In US and Canadian cities, the latter type of development where there might be
hundreds of townhouses and low rise apartments designed around community
facilities is not uncommon in outer and growth areas. But the dynamics of the
Australian housing market, much of it arguably driven by the affordability patterns
documented above, create a barrier to the emergence of such a development
form.

9.5

Affordability performance of rental housing on a spatial
basis

1. The rental affordability patterns reaffirm the problem of increasingly polarised
urban form. As more and more renters, notably families, are pushed to outer
urban areas, the response will come from landlords buying up existing stock of
detached dwellings. In the absence of either carrots or sticks, the process will not
drive much new purpose-built rental accommodation, particularly multi-unit
housing. The rental drivers will reinforce the homogeneity of dwelling form in such
areas.
2. The inability of low to moderate income households to afford inner city and middle
ring housing is highly problematic. These were the areas where such households
traditionally found accommodation and it is also where the services they use and
the sectors they may work in, for example security, cleaning and hospitality, are
disproportionately located. Many would argue it was their residence in these areas
that created the social and economic mix that made such areas attractive. It is
important that low cost rental stock be retained in such areas, and programs such
as the NRAS are very significant in terms of achieving this, but affordable housing
providers in these areas will always confront the land cost barrier, and
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Commonwealth programs cannot be expected to deal with this. The low cost
rental shortage in such areas is a rationale not only for inclusionary zoning, but for
the formation of a regional authority with the responsibility for land amalgamation
and planning coordination, including around affordable rental provision, and for
some flexibility in the central agency requirement that government land (of which
there are still considerable holdings in inner areas) should be sold at full market
value.
3. The findings simply reaffirm the need for more social housing, given the clear
market failure in the private rental sector.

9.6

Implications for social housing

1. Besides documenting the need for social and affordable housing, the study also
suggests that the current household rent used in public housing (Victoria being the
example) is neither here nor there; it neither provides housing agencies with a
sustainable rent nor does it provide an affordable rent for many tenants. In
addition, the way it is structured means that some households benefit more than
others. A household rent based on the residual income method is not the answer
as it too has its problems, but it could be used to provide information for a different
type of rent (e.g. a fixed cost rent by household type and size modified for location
and dwelling quality). In short, a restructuring of rent accompanied by a new
funding model is essential for the sustainability and equity objectives of social
housing.
2. The analysis does raise the question of whether there could be a parallel program
aimed at home purchase. If eligible households could get the $9100 per annum
indexed as a household subsidy (it could be targeted, e.g. at key professions that
receive low pay, e.g. the human services sector), many NRAS households would
be able to afford home purchase. There would need to be conditions. It could only
be for a new dwelling and therefore increases supply, and importantly the funds
provided would in effect be contingent loans to be repaid out of capital gains when
the property is sold. This would enable households to build equity and have the
other ontological advantages of ownership but without great long-term cost to
government. Alternatively or in addition, a scheme could be targeted at housing
growth providers, but for sale not rental. Purchasers would buy in at a discount on
the market price, but the property could only be sold back to the growth provider
on a formula that kept the stock at below market values. Again, the objective of
such a national affordable home purchase scheme is to enable households to
build equity and have ontological security while simultaneously increasing the
affordable housing stock. It could replace the FHOG and therefore use the same
budget allocation but provide better outcomes.

9.7

Overall conclusion

While exploratory, the findings in this report suggest the usefulness of the residual
income method as a basis for more informed decision-making around affordability
issues and for more detailed analysis of the implications. The analysis is far from
exhaustive and more work needs to be done in extending it to more households and
working through in greater detail the implications for market behaviour.
One of the model’s limitations is the complexity in creating it, and thus this Final
Report is accompanied by a template of the model to enable any agency or individual
to undertake residual income analysis based on whatever assumptions of gross
income, interest rates, deposits, taxation, pensions, benefits and allowances are
relevant to their research purpose.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Summary of assumptions and methods in
building budget standard models
This appendix outlines in some detail the features of the model and how taxes and
benefits are incorporated into it, using the examples of two household types: a single
person and a couple with two children.
1. The model provides multiple indicators of affordability:
The model allows for a number of different applications. For home purchase they are:
a. maximum affordable mortgage payment
b. maximum affordable mortgage loan
c. maximum affordable purchase price
d. share of houses sold in 2010 that were affordable.
For rental they are:
e. maximum affordable rent
f. share of houses rented in 2010 that were affordable.
2. Affordability for a broad range of incomes:
The method allows for calculation of affordability indicators for a very large income
spectrum. For renters it starts at $10 000, but in home purchase the starting income is
$30 000 as it is assumed that purchase is not affordable below this level. Incomes are
at $1000 intervals of gross annual household income up to $150 000.
3. Affordability for two case study household types:
Necessarily the residual income model is household-specific as that is one of its
characteristic features (i.e. the ability to reveal that different household types have
very different expenditures and therefore very different abilities to borrow). There are
many types once permutations of marital status and number of children are taken into
account. For the purpose of this study, we concentrated on two indicative types:
a. single adult, no children
b. couple, two children.
4. Affordability based upon two residual income non-housing standards:
The development of a residual income model of housing affordability requires
indicative budget standards for different household types. Australia is fortunate to
have the two standards developed by the SPRC at the University of New South Wales
(Saunders et al. 1998):
a. low cost budget standard (LCBS) non-housing elements indexed for price
changes
b. modest but adequate budget standard (MCBS) non-housing elements indexed
for price changes.
These budget standards are indicative and some elements have been questioned,
notably child care costs and housing costs (DFaCs 2007). The housing estimates are
not relevant for this study as they emerge as a residual from the other data, and the
child care methodological issues are not so great as to change the expenditure
estimates in a way that could invalidate the findings here. There are also certain
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consumption items whose importance has changed over time (e.g. mobile phones,
broadband) and these have been factored into the final analysis, along with a
measure of debt which has also increased greatly since the SPRC study. The MCBS
assumes a monthly broadband charge of $20 and a mobile phone charge of $20.
There is also the problem with the SPRC budget standards that they assume
expenditures are very similar across Australia. This would certainly be the case in
capital cities and adjacent regional areas, but there are parts of Australia, for example
remote areas or resource intensive areas (often one and the same), where many
items by virtue of transport costs or high commercial rents are much dearer. The
model therefore cannot have applicability in such areas.
5. User-set parameters to test market conditions as well as index over time:
The budget standards were developed in the late 1990s and therefore the parameters
of any measures or indicators based on them have to be adapted for current
circumstances. These include:
a. indexing to relevant time period by a composite index of 50 per cent household
disposable income and 50 per cent CPI
b. mortgage loan-to-value ratio of 80 per cent
c. mortgage loan term (25 years)
d. mortgage interest rates (rates for June of relevant year)
e. mortgage establishment costs, for example stamp duty, legal (rates for relevant
year).
6. Income assumptions:
a. For two-adult households, 60 per cent of total income is assumed to be from
adult male employment and 40 per cent from adult female employment. It is
assumed that no other family members’ income is relevant for loan eligibility or is
used in rental payments.
7. Income tax computations:
a. Income tax rates are based on personal tax rates for the 2009–10 financial
year.
b. Tax rates are based on withholding rates for pay-as-you-go and do not include
amounts credited or debited for taxation financial reconciliation such as the
Medicare levy or low income tax offset. The computations also exclude tax
deductions that are household-specific, such as those for length of tax year,
higher education payments and the private health insurance offset. However,
there are a number of income-based tax credits and benefits that are not
household-specific.
8. Income-based tax benefits and credits:
The value of the following benefits has been computed, with the specifics differing by
household type as Table A1 below shows and the accompanying text explains further.
Consistent with Australian government policy, Newstart is based on disposable
income while Family Tax Benefits are based on annual gross income. These are
benefits prior to the 2010–11 budget.
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Table A1: Relevant tax benefits and credits for sample household types
Household type

Newstart

Family Tax Benefit
Part A

Family Tax Benefit
Part B

Single person

√

X

X

Sole parent, 1 child

√

√

√

Couple, no children

√

X

X

Couple, 2 children

√

√

√

9. Modelling adjustment for specific household types
a. Sole person household: Not eligible for Family Tax Benefits, and for
purchasers the $30 000 income cut-off means that no single persons are eligible
for Newstart as it ceases at a disposable income of $853.34 per fortnight for
single persons. Lowering of the cut-off below this requires computation of
Newstart for this household group.
b. Couple household with two children: Eligible for Newstart up to $45 000. Family
Tax Benefit Part A (FTBA) of $313.88 per fortnight is paid in full until combined
income reaches $44 165 and then decreases on a sliding scale until the upper
limit of $107 000. Maximum payment for Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTBB) is
$93.10 per fortnight, based on the ‘non-primary earner’ if the primary earner’s
annual income is below $150 000. As it is based on the income of the nonprimary earner, FTBB is no longer paid once the couple’s combined income
reaches $42 000.
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Appendix 2: Testing of different indexing methods
Figure A1: Comparisons of outcomes for different indexing methods for the budget
standard

Appendix 2 shows what would be the effect of choosing different indices for the
budget standard. The household disposable index (HDI) would increase it at a much
greater rate than the all groups CPI. Thus 13 years from the base year of 1997 the
HDI is 35 per cent higher than the all groups CPI. This is because the former relates
only to income increases and takes no account of expenditures. Choosing this would
exaggerate the degree of affordability problems. On the other hand, the all groups
index includes housing and the budget standard as used for the purposes of this study
excludes housing and financial expenditures, and thus that is not an appropriate
measure. Thus, the relevant expenditure index should be the CPI all groups minus
housing. The problem with this measure, however, is that it does not take into account
any change in tastes as incomes rise or new products emerge in response to greater
affluence (e.g. mobile phone use and broadband). The compromise was to create a
‘shandy index’ which is half of the rate of the increase of the HDI and half that of the
CPI minus housing costs.
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Appendix 3: Regions of Melbourne
Appendix 3 shows the local government areas that make up the regional boundaries
used in the figures and tables of Section 6.3. These are regions used by the Victorian
Department of Planning and Communities.
Inner: Yarra, Stonnington, Port Phillip, Melbourne.
Middle: Manningham, Bayside, Hobsons Bay, Moonee Valley, Banyule, Maribyrnong,
Kingston, Whitehorse, Darebin, Monash, Moreland, Boroondara, Glen Eira.
Outer: Nillumbik, Knox, Maroondah, Greater Dandenong, Frankston, Brimbank.
Fringe: Cardinia, Yarra Ranges, Whittlesea, Melton, Hume, Mornington Peninsula,
Casey, Wyndham.
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Appendix 4: Calculating affordable rent and rent assistance
Households who pay a rent above a threshold rent and receive a Centrelink payment
(such as a pension, allowance or more than the base rate of Family Tax Benefit Part
A) are eligible for rent assistance. The amount depends upon the type of household,
the rent paid above the threshold rent, and the rent assistance rate (currently 75c for
every $1 above the threshold rent) up to the maximum amount of rent assistance. In
the model, the affordable rent is the disposable income after other expenses plus rent
assistance. Rent assistance is calculated in a way which maximises the level of rent
assistance paid. The formula for calculating the affordable rent is as follows:
1. If disposable income is less than the threshold rent for the household type, the
affordable rent is the disposable income (and no rent assistance is paid).
2. If disposable income is above the rent at which maximum rent assistance is paid,
the affordable rent is the disposable income plus the maximum rent assistance for
that household type (and the maximum rent assistance is paid).
3.

If disposable income is between the threshold rent and the rent at which
maximum rent assistance is paid, the affordable rent is calculated as the
disposable income (DI) less the threshold rent (Rth) multiplied by rent assistance
rate (r), divided by 1 minus the rent assistance rate (r), that is, (DI-Rth x r)/(1-r)
(and rent assistance is the difference between the affordable rent and disposable
income). In other words, the rent is proportioned appropriately, depending on
where the household sits between the threshold rent and the upper maximum.
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